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Abstract: Using state-level data from India over the period 1983 to 2005, this paper shows a 
strong negative relationship between financial depth (as measured by credit volume) and rural 
poverty. Instrumental variable regressions suggest that this relationship is robust to 
endogeneity biases. Furthermore, financial deepening has a bigger impact on rural poverty 
alleviation than outreach (as measured by branch penetration). We find suggestive evidence 
that financial deepening reduced poverty rates especially among self-employed in the rural 
areas and also supported an inter-state migration trend from rural areas into the tertiary sector 
in urban areas, consistent with financial deepening being driven by credit to the tertiary 
sector. Our findings suggest that financial deepening contributed to poverty alleviation in 
rural areas by fostering entrepreneurship and inducing geographic-sectoral migration. 
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Finance as a fundamental driver of economic growth, especially in middle income countries, 
has been largely accepted after several decades of research in this area.1 The debate today has 
shifted to the multifaceted nature of financial development, specifically on the role of 
financial depth versus outreach. While financial deepening has accelerated in emerging 
markets, it has not always been accompanied by increased use of financial services (World 
Bank, 2014). Previous empirical evidence has shown that financial deepening fosters 
economic growth and reduces income inequality (Beck, Levine, and Levkov; 2010, Bruhn 
and Love, 2014) but the effects of financial outreach are less understood, even as financial 
inclusion is being adopted as a top development priority by policymakers worldwide.2 
This paper contributes to a better understanding of the role of financial outreach versus depth 
by using annual household survey data from India over the period 1983 to 2005. Specifically, 
using geographic (state-level) and time variation in commercial bank credit to State GDP as 
proxy for financial depth and bank branch penetration as proxy for financial outreach, we 
find that it is depth rather than outreach that is more robustly linked to a reduction in rural 
(but not urban) poverty over this specific period.  Exploring the mechanisms and channel, we 
offer suggestive evidence that financial depth helped reduce rural poverty both through 
higher entrepreneurship and inter-state migration into employment in the tertiary sector. 
There are two novel components to our empirical design. First, India offers the perfect 
landscape to examine these issues because it has a long history of implementing policies 
targeting financial outreach and has recently become the poster child for financial inclusion 
 
1 See Levine (2005) for a review. 
2 Financial depth refers to the overall provision of financial services (such as credit) in the economy, while 
financial outreach refers to the ease with which firms and households can gain access to such financial services. 
While generally deeper financial systems offer greater access, the relation is far from perfect (World Bank, 
2008). We discuss this distinction in detail in the data section. 
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with the Prime Minister making a bank account for each household a national priority.3 
Furthermore there is large sub-national variation in socio-economic and institutional 
development, and significant policy changes over the sample period (Besley, Burgess and 
Esteve-Volart, 2007), including in the legal framework underpinning bank lending (Visaria, 
2009). By focusing on a specific country, using data from a consistent data source and 
exploiting pre-determined cross-state variation in socio-economic conditions, we alleviate 
problems associated with cross-country studies, including measurement error, omitted 
variable and endogeneity biases. 
Second, we incorporate the policy changes in our empirical design to address endogeneity 
concerns.   First, we follow Burgess and Pande (2005) and exploit the policy driven nature of 
rural bank branch expansion across Indian states as an instrument for branch penetration and 
thus financial breadth.  Second, we use increases in judicial efficiency of Indian courts 
following the establishment of Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) in India that provide 
exogenous and staggered changes in enforcement costs across states and time as an 
instrument for financial depth. 4 This follows earlier work by Visaria (2009) and others who 
study the impact of DRT on corporate outcomes as well as a large law and finance literature 
(e.g. La Porta et al. 1998) showing the impact of contract enforcement costs on overall 
financial development. 
 
3 On August 28, 2014, the Prime Minister of India launched Jan Dhan Yojana, a national campaign for financial 
inclusion under which 18 million bank accounts were opened during the first week alone.  See Agarwal et al. 
(2017) for an early assessment.  
4 The Government of India (GoI) passed a national law in 1993 to establish DRTs across the country to help 
Indian banks recover bad loans, where banks and financial institutions could file suits against defaulted 
borrowers. Once the DRTs were set up in five states by 1994, the process was halted by a legal challenge to the 
law and then resumed two years later in 1996 upon a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court of India. By 
2000, all Indian states had access to a DRT. However, there is wide variation in the use of DRT across different 
regions. Hence, since we are focused on the efficiency gain (in the form of quicker resolution of contractual 
disputes and lower enforcement costs) from the implementation of DRT, our specific instrument is constructed 




We find that financial depth is negatively and significantly associated with rural poverty in 
India over the period 1983-2005. This relationship is robust to using different measures of 
rural poverty, controlling for time-varying state characteristics, and state and year fixed 
effects. We find no significant relationship of financial depth with urban poverty rates. The 
relationship of financial depth with rural poverty reduction is also economically meaningful. 
One standard deviation in Credit to SDP (within-state, within-year) explains 17 percent of the 
demeaned variation in the proportion of the population below the poverty line (Headcount 
ratio). We also find that over the time period 1983-2005, financial depth has a more 
significant relationship with poverty reduction than financial outreach. Our measure of 
financial outreach, branches per capita, has a negative but insignificant relationship with rural 
poverty over this period (though it is significant over the period 1960 to 2005, in line with 
Burgess and Pande, 2005, but even there branch penetration has less than half the explanatory 
power as financial depth).5 
Our micro-data also allow us to explore different channels identified by theory through which 
financial development lowers rural poverty. On the one hand, better access to credit enables 
the poor to pull themselves out of poverty by investing in their human capital and 
microenterprises, thus reducing aggregate poverty (e.g. Banerjee and Newman, 1993). These 
theories have also been behind the microfinance movement (Hermes and Lensink, 2007). On 
the other hand, more efficient resource allocation by the financial sector (not necessarily to 
the poor, though), will benefit especially the poor if – as a result – they are included in the 
formal labor market. Thus, there could be indirect general equilibrium effects that explain the 
effect of financial depth on poverty. We find suggestive evidence for the entrepreneurship 
 
5 When we decompose branch penetration over time into rural versus urban areas, the effect of the rural 
branching policy before and after 1989 is clearly visible. After 1990, the expansion of branches seems to have 
taken place largely in urban areas only. In regression estimations, over the time period 1983-2005, we find a 
weakly significant relationship between rural branches per capita and rural poverty in the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimations but this does not survive instrumental variable estimations to address causality issues. 
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channel, as the poverty-reducing effect of financial deepening falls primarily on self-
employed in rural areas. We also identify migration from rural to urban areas as a potentially 
important channel through which financial depth reduces rural poverty. In particular, there is 
inter-state migration of workers for employment reasons towards financially more developed 
states, suggesting that poorer population segments in rural areas migrated to urban areas. This 
finding is also consistent with our instrumental variable strategy based on the introduction of 
Debt Recovery Tribunals for larger loans, thus capturing the effect of financial efficiency 
rather than inclusion.  The rural primary and tertiary urban sectors benefitted most from this 
migration, consistent with evidence showing that the Indian growth experience has been led 
by the services sector rather than labor intensive manufacturing (Bosworth, Collins and 
Virmani, 2007). We also find that it is specifically the increase in bank credit to the tertiary 
sector that accounts for financial deepening post-1991 and its poverty-reducing effect.6 
Our finding that financial depth is more robustly associated with rural poverty reduction than 
outreach has important policy implications. As pointed out by several studies including 
Panagriya (2006), the returns to increased density of bank branches are bound to diminish 
rapidly since after a point, new branches would get business only by taking away customers 
from the existing branches and raising costs without yielding extra poverty reduction. Our 
paper shows that financial deepening has a strong and persistent effect on poverty reduction. 
This paper contributes to the recent literature on the role of financial sector development in 
poverty reduction.  Theory makes contradictory predictions about which income group 
should benefit most from financial sector deepening. Some studies argue that credit 
constraints are particularly binding for the poor (Banerjee and Newman,1993; Galor and 
Zeira, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997) and that finance helps overcome barriers of 
 
6 This finding is also consistent with Arnold et al. (2016) who find that following liberalization of the services 
sector in India, a more efficient services sector has increased productivity in manufacturing. 
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indivisible investment (McKinnon, 1973). Other studies have claimed that only the rich can 
pay the “entry fee” into the financial system (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990) and credit is 
channeled to incumbents, not to entrepreneurs with the best opportunities (Lamoreaux, 1986). 
In a cross-country setting, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2007) find that banking sector 
development is associated with a reduction in income inequality across countries.7 Our paper 
advances the cross-country literature in several ways. First, using a single country framework 
allows us to better exploit pre-determined cross-state variation in financial development 
which is important in a country like India that has large sub-national variation in socio-
economic and institutional development across different states. More importantly, Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2007) do not analyze the impact of a specific, exogenous policy 
change and hence are unable to comment on how to foster poverty-reducing financial 
development. Given the significant policy changes in India over the sample period (Besley, 
Burgess and Esteve-Volart, 2007), including in the legal framework underpinning bank 
lending (Visaria, 2009), our setting allows us to better address identification issues and also 
comment on the channels through which financial development leads to poverty alleviation. 
Second, we study the relationship of both financial depth and outreach with poverty and find 
that financial depth has a statistically more significant and economically stronger relationship 
with poverty reduction than financial outreach. Most other papers only look at the impact of 
either financial depth or outreach (e.g. Beck, Levine, and Levkov, 2010; Bruhn and Love, 
2014; Burgess and Pande, 2005).   
Given the large domination of the banking sector in India by public sector banks, our paper 
also relates to the large literature on the government ownership of banks. La Porta, Lopez-de-
 
7 Other cross-country studies have studied the relationship between financial development and the level of 
income inequality. Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) and Li, Xu, and Zou (2000) find a negative relationship between 
finance and the level of income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, a finding confirmed by Clarke, 
Xu, and Zhou (2006), using both cross-sectional and panel regressions and instrumental variable methods.  
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Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) demonstrate that government ownership of banks is prevalent in 
both developing and developed countries, and is associated with slower financial 
development and slower growth. Several studies have shown that state control leads to 
political considerations determining credit allocation, making the banking sector susceptible 
to elite capture (Sapienza, 2004; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Dinc, 2005; Cole, 2009; and 
Carvalho, 2014). Our paper contributes to this literature by examining if state-led expansion 
of the banking sector has an impact on poverty. 
Our findings also contribute to the literature on the channels through which finance affects 
income equality and poverty ratios (e.g. Beck, Levine, and Levkov, 2010; Gine and 
Townsend, 2004).While Beck, Levine, and Levkov (2010) show that banking deregulation in 
the US lowered income inequality in the US  through the indirect effects of higher labor 
demand and higher wages for lower income groups,our paper  provides suggestive evidence 
that financial sector development reduces rural poverty in India both by fostering 
entrepreneurship in rural areas and by facilitating migration of workers from rural secondary 
and tertiary sectors to the urban tertiary sector. It is thus not necessarily the direct access to 
external finance, but rather general equilibrium effects that can explain our findings. 
Our paper also relates to the literature linking reforms of contractual institutions with 
financial sector development in India. Visaria (2009) shows that the DRT tribunals not only 
reduced delinquency for the average loan but also lowered the interest rates suggesting that 
the speedier processing of debt recovery suits can lower the cost of credit and Lilienfeld-Toal, 
Mookherjee and Visaria (2012) show that total credit increased for larger borrowers, while it 
decreased for smaller borrowers, consistent with an inelastic aggregate supply of credit and 
additional demand by larger borrowers more easily satisfied. Gopalan, Mukherjee and Singh 
(2014) show that improvement in judicial efficiency due to the DRTs resulted in a significant 
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increase in the ratio of long-term debt to assets.8 Chemin (2009, 2012) uses the geographic 
variation in the procedural handling of court cases in India following a reform in 2002 to 
show that a more efficient court procedure resulted in a reduction in case backlog in courts, 
lower contract breach, and higher investment by firms in fixed assets.9 We use the DRT 
reform to extract the component of financial depth, related to larger firm lending and thus 
higher efficiency and depth rather than outreach of the financial system. 
Finally, our paper also adds to a flourishing literature on economic development in India, (see 
Besley et al., 2007 for an earlier survey). Specifically, researchers have focused on 
differences in political accountability (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Pande, 2003), labor market 
regulation (Besley and Burgess, 2004; Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy, 2007; Dougherty, 
Robles, and Krishna, 2011), land reform (Besley and Burgess, 2000; Banerjee and Iyer, 
2005), trade liberalization (Topalova, 2010; Edmonds et al., 2010) and gender inequality 
(Iyer et al., 2012). Directly related to our paper, Burgess and Pande (2005) relate a social 
banking policy on branching to differences in poverty alleviation across states. More recently, 
Allen et al. (2012) explore different financing sources for firms in India and Gormley (2010) 
gauges the impact of foreign bank entry on firm financing in India.   Our paper adds to this 
literature by focusing on cross-state differences in financial deepening after the 1991 
liberalization episode and by comparing the effect of two different dimensions of financial 
development – total credit volume and branch penetration of financial institutions. 
Before proceeding, we would like to offer some caveats.  First, our measures of financial 
depth and outreach are crude proxy indicators. The finance and growth literature has used 
Credit/GDP as standard indicator even though it might capture the efficiency of financial 
 
8 See Vig (2013) for an alternate view on the impact of strengthening creditor rights. Vig (2013) finds that the 
SARFAESI Act (Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interests 
Act) 2002 increased the threat of premature liquidation prompting firms to avoid debt leading to an overall 
reduction in total debt. 
9 For evidence from other developing countries, see Ponticelli and Alencar (2016) and Assuncao, Bemmelech 
and Silva (2013) for Brazil and Campello and Larrain (2016) for Romania. 
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institutions only to a limited extent. Similarly, branch penetration is a rather crude but more 
easily available indicator than the actual share of population having access to and using 
financial services. However, the correlation between our branch penetration measure and the 
share of households reporting cash borrowings from institutional credit agencies in Census 
data in 2002-03 is 0.85 across states.10  Second, even though we use exogenous variation in 
branch penetration and financial depth as instrumental variables, our identification strategy is 
not perfect and we are therefore careful to not draw causal inferences, but rather refer to 
relationships.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents data and methodology. 
Section 3 discusses our main results, documenting the relationship between financial 
development and poverty using both OLS and IV regressions. Section 4 explores different 
channels through which finance affects poverty. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data, methodology, and summary statistics  
In this section, we describe the data sources from which we construct our measures of 
poverty and financial development, present summary statistics, and discuss the empirical 
research design used for examining the relationship between finance and the poverty.  
2.1. Data and Summary Statistics 
2.1.1. Poverty Measures 
We construct poverty measures across 15 Indian states11 covering 95% of India’s population, 
using 20 rounds of the Indian household expenditure surveys. The Indian National Sample 
 
10 The number of households reporting cash borrowings is drawn from NSS Debt and Investment Survey which 
is conducted in 2002-03 and not available in other years for our period of study. 
11 The states are: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. They contained 95.4% of 
Indian population in the 2011 nationwide census.  Where states split during the sample period, we continued to 
consider them as one unit, using weighted averages for variables, with population shares being the weights. 
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Survey Organization (NSSO) has been conducting Consumer Household Expenditure surveys 
since the 1950s, eliciting detailed household level information on household characteristics 
such as household size, education, socio-religious characteristics, demographic characteristics 
of household members and detailed expenditure patterns. Our panel dataset extends from 
1983 to 2005 and builds on the state-level aggregates, complemented by data provided in 
Datt, Özler and Ravallion (1996). In robustness tests for our baseline regressions, we also use 
data for the period 1965 to 2005.12 
We construct two measures of poverty. First, Headcount is the proportion of the population 
below the poverty line, as defined by the National Planning Commission (1993)13 and 
adjusted yearly by price increases, and measures the incidence of poverty. Second, Poverty 
Gap is the mean distance separating the poor population from the poverty line as a proportion 
of poverty line. The calculation process of the poverty measures is described in detail in the 
data appendix B. We compute Headcount and Poverty Gap separately for rural and urban 
areas.14 Figure 1 charts the average evolution of the Rural and Urban Headcount ratios across 
the 15 states in our sample. The overall pattern suggests that both measures of poverty 
declined over the sample period except for sharp fluctuation in the early 1990s following 
economic liberalization. 
 
12 Detailed household survey data are not available before 1983 and we can therefore not run the channel 
regressions of section 4 over longer time periods.  
13 We test the robustness of our results to the new poverty line measures suggested by the Tendulkar Committee 
of the Planning Commission of India. Official estimates based on the new poverty line and methodology exist 
for only two years - 1993-04 and 2004-05 – and are presented in Radhakrishna et al. (2009). Compared to the 
older poverty line measures, the new estimates are based on normative expenditure on food, education, and 
health and are higher than calorie intake lines. Panagariya and Mukim (2013) discuss the controversies 
regarding the different poverty lines and find that no matter which poverty line is used, poverty has declined 
steadily in all states over time. When we apply the new poverty lines (price adjusted for the other years) we find 
a parallel increase in the poverty measure across states with no change in the qualitative results of our 
regressions. See data appendix for details. More recently in June 2014, the Rangarajan Committee Report issued 
new poverty line estimates for 2011/12 based on a new methodology but also concluded that the percentage 
point decline in headcount rations over the period 2004-05 to 2011-12 are not markedly different between the 
Tendulkar and Rangarajan Committee methodologies.  
14 The poverty line and price indices differ between rural and urban areas. Consistent with Topalova (2010), we 
adjusted the measures for the schedule change in the survey. In addition, we controlled for the seasonality bias 
due to different timing of the surveys. See data appendix for details. 
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Table 1 shows that mean Rural Headcount in our sample period is 31.9 percent and larger 
than the corresponding Urban Headcount of 25.9 percent. While there is a large variation in 
both rural and urban poverty levels across states and over time, there is a smaller, although 
significant, variation within states over time. The Appendix table A2 shows summary 
statistics for the main variables in each of the 15 states in India, with significant geographic 
variation.  
Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 here 
2.1.2. Financial Development and Other Control Variables 
Before explaining the financial development measures, we provide some statistics on the 
structure of banking system of India. Figure 2 shows the overall number of branches and total 
credit by bank ownership over the sample period in India. The data of total credit by bank 
ownership is not available before 2001.  It can be clearly seen that public banks dominate the 
banking sector of India by sizing about 68 percent of branches and about 70 percent of total 
credit. In addition, while one quarter of total branches are cooperative and regional rural 
banks (non-commercial banks), less than 5 percent of total credit is allocated by them. In 
comparison, private and foreign banks with less than 10 percent of total branches allocate at 
least 20 percent of total credit. As of 2013, of 89 commercial banks, 26 were public sector 
banks (20 nationalized banks and 6 State Bank of India and its Associates), 20 were domestic 
private sector banks, and 43 were foreign banks. Non-commercial banks include 56 regional 
rural banks and more than 500 cooperative banks. 
In our analysis, we distinguish between two different dimensions of financial development 
(Cihak and Demirguc-Kunt, 2013). Specifically, one way to characterize financial systems is 
the size of financial institutions relative to the size of the economy, Financial Depth. 
Financial depth relates to the overall extent of financial services available in a country and 
12 
 
there is an extensive literature documenting the importance of depth for growth and poverty 
alleviation (e.g. see Levifne, 2005 for a review). A second characteristic of the financial 
system is also the ability of individuals and firms in an economy to access financial services, 
Financial Access. Financial access has been shown to accelerate economic growth and 
particularly benefit the lower end of the income distribution (e.g. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2007; Beck, Levine, and Levkov, 2010). Barriers to financial access can include the 
lack of geographic proximity to bank outlets, lack of the necessary documentation (formal 
registration and property rights, audited financial statements etc.), and the lack of assets that 
can be used as collateral.15 
While generally deeper financial systems offer greater access, the relation is far from perfect 
(World Bank, 2008). Many banking systems, especially in developing countries, are skewed 
towards the wealthy or large enterprises due to a number of reasons including allocation 
based on connections and nonmarket criteria (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 2003), and physical 
access, affordability and eligibility issues (e.g. Beck et al. 2007). As noted by Claessens and 
Perotti (2007), even if financial depth is associated with more economic growth, when very 
few firms and households benefit (i.e. financial access is poor), the resulting growth may be 
of lower “quality.”16  
We use two different indicators of financial development at the state level, with underlying 
data from the Reserve Bank of India, to capture these two dimensions. Credit to SDP is the 
ratio of total commercial bank credit outstanding to the Net State Domestic Product and 
gauges the depth of financial development. Branches per Capita is the total number of 
 
15 In the following, we will use Financial Outreach rather than Financial Access to highlight the supply-side 
character of our branch penetration measure. 
16 The difference between these two dimensions can be illustrated by the access to credit by firms of different 
sizes. An expansive literature has shown that SMEs rely on geographic proximity to banks (reflecting the need 
for relationships and collection of soft information by banks), much more so than large enterprises (where bank 
lending relies more on formal balance sheet and other publicly available information). A high level of 
Credit/SDP might reflect primarily loans to large enterprises, while a wide branch network might reflect 
geographic ease of access to credit services (by, among others, SMEs). 
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operating bank branches per million persons in each state and is a measure of the extent of 
financial outreach. Table 1 shows that the standard deviation of both measures over time is 
higher than across states, reflecting the upward trend in depth and trend reversal in outreach 
over the sample period. Commercial Bank Credit to SDP varies from 11.0 percent in Assam 
to 58.5 percent in Maharashtra with a national average of 27 percent.17 We also split the 
Branches per capita into Rural branches per capita and Urban branches per capita to 
examine if rural branch expansion specifically had an effect on poverty in rural areas. As 
alternate measures we also use Rural branch share (ratio of rural branches to all branches in 
a state and year) and Urban branch share (ratio of urban branches to all branches in a state 
and year).  
Figure 3 shows a decomposition of branches and credit by rural versus urban areas over time. 
While we find that the increasing trend of urban branches after 1991 corresponds with an 
increasing share of urban credit, we also see that rural branch expansion was largely before 
1989 when the rural branching policy was in effect.  
Figure 4 shows an upward trend of commercial bank credit over the sample period. On 
average across the 15 states, commercial bank credit increased from 18.7 percent of SDP in 
1980 to 50.3 percent in 2005. In our sample, Punjab has the highest number of branches per 
million people (112) compared to Assam which has fewer than 50 branches per million 
people. Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of branch opening per capita in India. The data show 
trend breaks around 1990, which may be attributed to the suspending of the 1:4 branch 
license rule in 1990 according to which commercial banks were required to open 4 new 
branches in previously unbanked locations for every branch opening in an already banked 
location. 
 
17 In robustness tests (available on request), we use the following alternate measures for financial development -
Bank credit/billion of population and Number of branches / SDP – and find similar results.  
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Insert Figure 2, 3, 4 and 5 here 
In investigating the relationship between financial sector development and poverty, we 
control for several other time-varying state characteristics. Appendix Table A1 details 
sources and provides extensive definitions. Specifically, we include the following variables: 
SDP per capita, which is net state domestic product per capita and a proxy for income levels, 
Rural Population Share, which is rural share of total population in each state, Literacy 
Rate, which is defined as proportion of persons who can both read and write with 
understanding in any language among population aged 7 years and above, and State 
Government Expenditure to SDP defined as total state government expenses over SDP.  
Insert Table 2 here 
Table 2 presents correlations between our main variables of interest and the control variables. 
The incidence and depth of poverty are highly correlated in both rural and urban areas 
(correlation coefficient ≥ 0.96), but we also find a significant correlation between the 
different rural and urban poverty measures: states with higher rural poverty also tend to have 
higher urban poverty. We find that both measures of financial development are positively 
correlated with each other, with a correlation coefficient of 40.5%,18 a negative correlation 
between the measures of financial development and rural and urban poverty measures. The 
only association that is not significant is between Urban Poverty Gap/Headcount and Credit 
to SDP.  
Given the positive and significant correlation between our two gauges of financial 
development, we perform a couple of additional tests to confirm whether these two variables 
 
18 This correlation, however, is far from perfect. For instance, while the state of Punjab has the highest financial 
penetration among states, it is at the median level in terms of financial depth. Similarly, Maharashtra with the 
highest financial depth has financial penetration near the median. Given that our regression set-up focuses on 
within-state, within-year relationships between financial development and poverty measures, we also consider 
the correlation between the de-trended variables which is 0.15 and significant at the 1% level.  
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capture independent dimensions of financial development. First, we test for Granger causality 
from branch penetration to Credit/SDP – while lagged Credit/SDP enters positively and 
significantly in a regression of Credit/SDP, lagged branch penetration enters either negative 
and significant or insignificant. Second, we follow Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) to do a 
panel non-causality test which separately runs a dynamic regression for each state. If the null 
is rejected it means that branches per capita does Granger-cause credit to SDP for at least one 
state. We find that even in states where the non-causality is rejected (4 out of 15) the effect of 
lag of branches per capita on credit to SDP is negative. This result is not consistent with the 
hypothesis that outreach drives depth. We find similar result for Granger causality from 
Credit/SDP to branch penetration, supporting our hypothesis that these two dimensions of 
financial development are independent even if correlated. 
When we look at the control variables we find that states with higher SDP per capita, greater 
government expenditures to SDP, higher literacy rates and smaller rural populations have 
lower rural and urban poverty and greater financial development. Critically, there is a high 
negative correlation between the rural population share and Credit to SDP. All our regression 
results are robust to including rural population share. Similarly, we also run all our 
regressions without SDP/capita given the relatively high correlation with Credit to SDP and 
again all our results hold. 
2.2. Identification strategy 
We are interested in using our state-level panel data on financial indicators and poverty 
outcomes to examine whether financial development reduced poverty in Indian states over 
the period 1983 to 2005. Our main regressions will focus on instrumental variables to extract 
the exogenous component of financial development. This allows us to not only control for 
reverse causation and omitted variable bias, but also address the measurement bias in the 
gauges of financial development mentioned above.  Specifically, by focusing on a legal 
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reform that allowed easier recovery of large loans, we extract the component of Credit/SDP 
that is driven by the consequent expansion of loans to such firms, documented by Visaria 
(2009) and thus the efficiency and depth component of this measure. Similarly, by focusing 
on the social branching policy, we extract the component of branches/capita driven by the 
financial inclusion policy of the government.  So, while we recognize the imperfection of the 
two indicators we are using, the instrumental variable strategy allows us to address this 
measurement bias to a certain extent. In this section, we first describe the different 
instrumental variables we use for the two different dimensions of financial development and 
specify the estimation methodology. 
2.2.1. Debt Recovery Tribunals 
An extensive literature has shown the importance of an effective contractual framework for 
financial sector development (e.g. La Porta et al. 1997, 1998), including an array of cross-
country but also country-level studies exploiting variation in judicial efficiency across sub-
national units. Directly related to our work, Visaria (2009) exploits subnational variation in 
the introduction of new tribunals to resolve large claim contract disputes and finds not only 
lower delinquency rates but also lower ex ante interest rates for borrowers of large amounts. 
We will use the staggered introduction of debt recovery tribunals across Indian states and the 
change in judicial efficiency their introduction implied, to extract the exogenous component 
of financial sector depth, i.e., Credit to SDP. 
The debt recovery tribunals (DRT) were introduced with a national act in 1993 to more 
quickly process legal suits instigated by banks against defaulting borrowers, using a 
streamlined procedure to speed up adjudication of cases, and allow for swift execution of the 
verdict.  There is a monetary threshold of 1 million Rupee (around 20,000 USD in 1993).  
However, the DRTs were established at different points in time across different states due to 
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constitutional challenges to the DRT Act. Specifically, it was not until 2002 that the Supreme 
Court accepted the constitutionality of the DRT and only after changes to DRT Act.  This 
constitutional uncertainty implied that it was up to the states to establish DRTs or not. Five 
tribunals were set up shortly after the original DRT Act in 1994, while other states set them 
up between 1996 and 1999, as illustrated in Figure 6. Following Visaria (2009) we can use 
this staggered introduction of DRTs to extract the exogenous component of credit 
intermediation.  As shown by Visaria (2009) and Lilienfeld et al. (2014) the timing of the 
establishment of DRTs across the different states was not related to the size of states, urban 
populations share, size of the industrial sector, level or growth of bank credit, states’ political 
structure, income level or efficiency of the judiciary.  
Insert Figures 6, 7 and 7 here 
Specifically, using state-variation in establishment of DRT, we extract the state- and year-
varying exogenous component of Credit to SDP by interacting a dummy indicating the 
introduction of the DRT (varying between 1994 and 1999) with the number of applications 
per million capita in the first year of functioning, thus capturing latent demand for an 
accelerated judicial process. Rather than simply focusing on the establishment of such courts, 
we also include the efficiency gain that this establishment should involve in the form of 
quicker resolution of contractual disputes and lower enforcement costs. Figure 7 shows that 
this variable ranges from 0.06 for the DRT responsible for Madhya Pradesh and Uttar 
Pradesh to 8.9 in Maharashtra. Theory suggests that higher demand for DRTs’ services (as 
captured by the application per million capita) will imply a stronger impact for the 
introduction of DRTs on financial deepening.  Figure 8 shows the difference in Credit to SDP 
and branches per capita across states with above and below median latent demand for DRTs 
in the years before and after the respective introduction of the DRT in a given state.  While 
the annual change in the gap in credit/SDP between them is less than 3 percent in the five 
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years leading up to the introduction of the DRT, after the introduction it rises by more than 7 
percent suggesting there is a much more pronounced increase in Credit to SDP in states with 
above-median latent demand for the DRT courts than in states with below-median latent 
demand.  We will test the significance of these differences more formally below. For branch 
penetration, however, we do not observe a trend break following the introduction of DRT. 
 
2.2.2. India’s social banking experiment 
Following independence in 1947, India went through a wave of bank nationalization in 1969 
which brought the fourteen largest commercial banks under the direct control of the Indian 
central bank. Shortly thereafter, the government launched a social banking program with the 
goal of opening branches in the most populous unbanked rural locations. To further facilitate 
rural branch expansion, the RBI announced a new licensing policy in 1977 whereby, to obtain 
a license for a new branch opening in an already branched location (one or more branches), 
commercial banks had to open branches in four unbanked locations. This rule remained in 
effect for thirteen years until it was revoked officially in 1990. Burgess and Pande (2005) 
show that between 1977 and 1990, rural branch expansion was relatively higher in financially 
less developed states while it was the reverse before 1977 and after 1990.  Thus, following 
Burgess and Pande’s approach, we use the resulting trend reversals between 1977 and 1990 
and post-1990 in how a state’s initial financial development affects rural branch expansion as 
instruments for branch openings in rural unbanked locations.  
Insert Figure 9 here 
Figure 9 illustrates this trend reversal in bank branches across states and over time, based on 
the following regression (Burgess and Pande, 2005). For state i in year t,  
Branchesit = η0 + η1 (Bi60×D60) + η2 (Bi60×D61) + … + η41 (Bi60×D05) + si + yt + εit,        
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i = 1, …, 15;     t = 1960, …, 2005                    (1)           
where Dt equals 1 in year t and zero otherwise, Bi60 is the initial level (in 1960) of branch 
penetration in that state, and si and yt are state and year dummies.  
Figure 9 graphs the ηk coefficients for the number of branches per million persons as 
dependent variable. We can see two clear trend reversals in 1977 and 1990. Prior to 1977, the 
ηk coefficients have an upward trend suggesting that financially developed states provide a 
more profitable environment for the new branches. With the imposition of the 1:4 rule in 
1977, the trend overturns and slopes downward until the rule was repealed in 1990. After 
1990, the ηk coefficients are almost unchanging and just slightly grow over time. This reflects 
that more or less all states were equally likely to attract new rural branches after the rural 
branch expansion ended.19 When we examine the effect of rural branch expansion on overall 
banking development by estimating equation (2) for bank credit, we find no evidence of 
similar trend reversals, consistent with Joshi and Little (1996) who point out that although the 
number of bank branches increased over the period 1969-1991, many banks were inefficient 
and unsound due to poor lending strategies under government control.  
In sum, the results from sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 imply that the introduction of specialized 
debt recovery tribunals was associated with financial deepening and more so in states with 
higher demand for such specialized courts. The rural branch expansion policy had a 
significant impact on the number of bank branches and increased the access of rural areas to 
banking but did not affect the depth of the banking sector.  
 
19 Panagariya (2006) and Kochar (2011) argue that India had a policy of linking urban branch expansion to rural 
branch expansion well before bank nationalization and 1977 is not a sharp break from the prior period in terms 
of the branch expansion rule. This does not concern our estimations since 1977 is not a trend break in our 
sample period of 1983-2005.  
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2.2.3. Empirical strategy 
Following sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, we use the following set-up for our instrumental variable 
specification to address endogeneity issues in the relationship between financial sector 
development and poverty. The first stage regression of our instrumental variable specification 
is as follows:  
FDit = λ0 + θ1(Appi× DRTi.t)  + θ2 DRTi.t  + δ1 ( (Bi60× [t −1977]×D77) + δ2 (Bi60× [t 
−1990]×D90) + λ Xit + si + yt + εit,   i = 1, …, 15,     t = 1983, …, 2005,  (2)     
where FDit is Credit to SDP or Branches per capita, DRTi.t is a dummy which equals one 
post-establishment of a DRT in a state and Appi is the number of applications per million 
during the first year of the existence of a DRT. Bi60 is the state-wise per capita rural branches 
in 196020, Xit is the set of control variables and includes SDP/capita, literacy rate and state 
government expenditure to GDP.21 si and yt are state and year fixed effects to control for any 
unobserved heterogeneity across states and years.  
The main coefficients of interest are θi and δi, where the θ1 coefficient measures the impact of 
the establishment of the DRTs on financial deepening and the δi’s check for trend breaks due 
to the 1:4 licensing rule. The coefficient δ1 measures the trend relationship between initial 
financial development in 1960 and FD (specifically branch expansion). The trend reversals in 
this relationship are given by δ1 and δ2.  
To analyze the relation between finance and poverty across Indian states, we estimate the 
following second stage regression: 
Povertyit = β0 + β1 Credit it-1 + β2 Branchesit-1 + β3 Xit-1 + si + yt + εit,    i =1,…,15,   
t=1983,…,2005,          (3)  
 
20 We use 1960 as initial year to be consistent with Burgess and Pande (2005). If we were to use 1950 as initial 
year, we find similar results (available on request).  
21 All our results are materially the same if we were to not use any of the control variables alleviating concerns 
about our estimates being biased by the bad control problem (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Furthermore, all 
results are robust to including rural population share. 
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where Povertyit is a measure of poverty in state i and time t and is one of the four poverty 
indicators –Rural Headcount, Rural Poverty Gap, Urban Headcount, Urban Poverty Gap. 
Bank Credit and Branches are the predicted values from the first stage regressions in (2) and 
the remaining variables are also the same as in (2). The coefficients of interest are β1 and β2 
which measure the effect of financial deepening and broadening access on poverty, 
respectively. We use one-period lags of all the explanatory variables. 
In all the regressions, by including state and time dummies we control for omitted variables 
that might drive the dependent variable over time or across states. We thus focus on the 
within-state, within-year variation in the relationship between finance and poverty alleviation, 
controlling for other time-variant state characteristics. We apply double clustering,22 both 
within states and within years to resolve the problem of underestimated standard errors 
arising from serial correlation of the error terms as suggested by Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan (2004).23 In further regressions and to disentangle the channels through which 
finance affects rural and urban poverty levels, we use different dependent variables, as we 
will discuss in detail below. 
3. Finance and poverty across states 
In this section, we examine if there is a significant relationship between financial 
development and poverty and if it is robust to endogeneity concerns using two instruments 
for financial development, the trend reversals induced by the rural branch expansion program 
and the demand for specialized DRT, introduced at different points in time across states.  We 
 
22 Our results are materially similar when we cluster only at the state level.  
23 The significance levels we obtain with this method should be treated as conservative because Cameron, 
Gelbach, and Miller (2008) suggest that when the number of clusters is less than 50, standard errors may be 
biased and need small sample correction such as the wild bootstrap procedure. However, as reported by Angrist 
and Prischke (2009, page 323), Hansen (2007) shows that the clustered standard errors reported by the software 
program Stata is reasonably good at correcting for serial correlation in panels even when the number of clusters 
is small.  
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first present and discuss the first-stage regressions, before moving to the second stage 
estimations. 
3.1. Finance, law and branching policy: first stage results 
Table 3 presents the first stage regressions following model (2). Specifically, we regress 
Credit to SDP and branch penetration on (i) the interaction terms between DRT establishment 
and number of DRT applications per million capita during the first year, and (ii) the 
interaction between bank branches in 1960, a post-1990 dummy and a time trend. We also 
control for other time-variant state characteristics included in the second stage, namely SDP 
per capita, literacy, and government expenditures to SDP.  
Insert Table 3 here 
The results in column (1) of Table 3 show that states with higher demand for DRT services 
after the introduction of a DRT have higher levels of Credit to SDP. The relationship is not 
only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful: one standard deviation in 
applications per million capita translates into an increase in Credit to SDP by 8.5 percent. On 
the other hand, the trend reversals in branch penetration associated with the social banking 
program cannot explain variation in financial depth.   
The results in column (2) of Table 3 show that the social banking policy can explain cross-
state, cross-year variation in branch penetration, while the DRT introduction cannot. Again, 
the results are not only statistically, but also economically significant. One additional branch 
per million capita in 1960 translates into 0.141 fewer annual branches per million people 
during the rural branching expansion, but after the program, it is associated with -0.01 (0.140-
0.141) branches less per million persons annually. The Cragg-Donald F statistic test, with 
critical values compiled by Stock-Yogo (2002), a weak identification test for the excluded 
exogenous variables, is highly significant. This test is essential when the number of 
23 
 
endogenous variables is more than one and the standard F-test may not truly reflect the 
relevance of instruments (for details see Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2007). We also report 
the Angrist-Pischke first-stage F-statistics, which are highly significant, indicating that our 
instruments are relevant (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).24  
When we consider separately rural and urban branches per capita, we similarly find that 
higher branch penetration in 1960 is associated with fewer additional rural branches during 
the period of rural branching operation, but more afterwards, while urban branch penetration 
is not significantly (at the 5% level) associated with these policy changes (columns (3) and 
(4)).   In summary, we find that the differences in demand for DRT services and judicial 
quality improvements after DRT introduction across states explain financial depth better than 
trend instruments while the reverse is true for branch penetration.  
In columns (5) and (6), we show the robustness of our first-stage results to using the 1965 to 
2005 sample period.25 In unreported tests we find similar results if we use Rural/Urban 
Branch share (ratio of rural/urban branches to all branches in a state and year) in place of 
Rural/Urban branches per capita. In Appendix Table A3 we show that our results in columns 
(1), (2), (5), and (6) are robust to including rural population share. 
 
3.2. Finance and poverty: second-stage results 
In this section, we present both OLS and IV regressions of the relationship between financial 
development and indicators of the incidence and extent of poverty in rural and urban areas. 
While the OLS regressions do not control for endogeneity and simultaneity bias, we still 
present them for purposes of comparison. 
 
24 Unlike other F-statistics, which test the first stage regression as a whole, the Angrist-Pischke first-stage F-test 
gauges the relevance of each endogenous variable.  
25 Over this period, we have three missing points for Assam, so the number of observations is 597.  
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Insert Table 4 here 
The OLS estimations in Table 4 show a negative relationship between Credit to SDP and the 
incidence and extent of rural poverty and no significant relationship between Credit to SDP 
and urban poverty.  While branch penetration enters negatively in all four regressions, it does 
not enter with a significant coefficient. In Appendix table A4, we find similar results if we 
were to include rural population share in columns (1) to (4) of Table 4. The insignificant 
effect of credit to SDP on urban poverty can be a first indication of a possible migration 
channel through which Credit to SDP impacts poverty. Columns (3) and (4) suggest that 
urban poverty is negatively associated with SDP per capita and Government expenditure as a 
share of SDP.   
In columns (5) to (8), when we consider rural and urban branch penetration separately, we 
find that rural branch penetration enters negatively and significantly at the 10%, while urban 
branch penetration does not enter significantly.  
Insert Table 5 here 
The IV regressions in Table 5 show a negative and significant relationship between Credit to 
SDP and rural poverty whereas there is no significant relationship between branch 
penetration and rural poverty (columns (1) and (2)). As in the case of the OLS regressions, 
neither Credit to SDP nor branch penetration enter significantly in the regressions of the 
urban poverty measures in columns (3) and (4). The relationship between Credit to SDP and 
rural poverty is not only statistically but also economically significant. Specifically, the point 
estimates in columns (1) and (2) imply that one within-state, within-year standard deviation 
in Credit to SDP explains 17 percent of demeaned variation in the Headcount and 22 percent 
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of demeaned variation in the Poverty Gap.26 The Hansen over-identification tests reported in 
columns (1) to (4) are not rejected suggesting that the instruments are valid instruments.  
When separating rural and urban branch penetration in columns (5) and (6), we find no effect 
of rural branch penetration on rural poverty.  
As the results on branch penetration are in contrast to the finding by Burgess and Pande 
(2005), we try to reconcile our results with their findings in columns (7) and (8) by expanding 
the sample period back to 1965. We find that branch penetration enters negatively and 
significantly in the regressions of Rural Headcount and Rural Poverty Gap. The insignificant 
relationship between branch penetration and poverty, in columns (1) and (2), is thus due to 
the shorter time span that does not include the starting point of rural branching program.  
Even over the longer time period, however, Bank Credit to SDP continues to enter negatively 
and significantly in the regressions of Rural Headcount and Rural Poverty Gap.  
To compare the economic effect of depth with breadth, we take a look at de-trended standard 
errors and use the longer sample period over which both financial depth and outreach are 
shown to have a significant relationship with rural poverty gauges. Between 1965 and 2005, 
the within state and year standard deviations of rural poverty, Credit to SDP and branches per 
capita are 5.910, 7.715, and 5.339 respectively. Using the coefficient estimates from columns 
(7) and (8) we compute that one standard deviation increase in Credit to SDP reduced Rural 
Headcount by 2.89, while a one standard deviation in branch penetration reduces Rural 
Headcount by 1.78. Thus, over the period 1965 to 2005, variation in branch penetration 
explains 30 percent of rural poverty reduction in India which is lower than the contribution of 
credit to SDP (49 percent).27  Over the longer time period, financial depth was more 
 
26The effect of credit/SDP on rural headcount and poverty gap are calculated as -0.168*4.87/4.95 = -0.17, and -
0.082*4.87/1.82 = -0.22, respectively. 
27 The effect of credit is -0.375*7.715/5.910=-0.49, and for branches it is -0.332*5.339/5.910=-0.30 
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important than financial outreach in reducing poverty, while in the more recent sample 
period, after 1983, only financial deepening can explain reductions in rural poverty.  
In further sensitivity tests in Appendix Tables A6 and A7 we control for additional time-
variant state factors, most of which, however, are not available for the whole sample period. 
First, we include the state government development expenditures as ratio to SDP, which 
might explain variation in poverty rates across states and over time. While this variable enters 
negatively and significantly, it does not change the economic or statistical significance of 
Credit to SDP. Second, we include an indicator to gauge the degree to which a state is open to 
trade with other countries, with annual data available for the period 1980 to 2002 (Marjit, Kar 
and Maiti, 2007). While trade openness does not enter significantly, Credit to SDP continues 
to enter negatively and significantly.  
Third, we control for an indicator of labor market regulation, based on Besley and Burgess 
(2004) and Gupta, Hasan and Kumar (2007) that indicates whether labor market regulation in 
a given state and year can be considered flexible, neutral or inflexible. As the labor market 
indicator does not vary after 1991, we also interact it with a time trend to test whether states 
with initially more flexible labor market regulation experienced faster poverty reduction post-
1991 liberalization. While the labor market index enters negatively, it does not enter 
significantly and our financial depth indicator continues to enter with a negative and 
significant coefficient. Fourth, we control for an indicator of physical infrastructure; 
specifically, the log of unit costs of electrical power supply, which we have available for the 
period up 2001 and after 2007, with data from the Planning Commission. We extrapolate for 
the period in between with linear extrapolation. While the unit cost of energy enters 
negatively and significantly at the 10% level (thus contrary to expectations), our main 
findings are confirmed.  
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Overall, this shows that even when controlling for development expenditures, trade openness, 
and infrastructure, some of which are also significantly correlated with financial depth, Credit 
to SDP instrumented by the demand for and efficiency of specialized courts, introduced at 
different points in time across states, continues to be negatively and significantly associated 
with rural poverty.  
In a further robustness test, we address the correlation between our measures of financial 
depth and financial outreach. Specifically, we net Credit/SDP and Branches per capita of the 
respective other variable by regressing Credit/SDP (Branches per capita) on state and year 
dummies and Branches per capita (Credit/SDP) and then predict Credit/SDP (Branches per 
capita). The two orthogonalized measures are explained by our policy variables in the first 
stage regressions in the same way as in Table 3. The second stage results confirm our 
findings from Table 5: the orthogonalized Credit/SDP enters negatively and significantly in 
the rural poverty regressions, but not in the urban poverty regressions while the 
orthogonalized branch penetration does not enter significantly in any of the regressions 
(results available on request).  
Finally, we address the concern that our findings are driven by time- rather than state-
variation and estimate a 2SLS regression using data averaged over five years before and after 
DRT adoption. The R-squared in the averaged first stage regression is high (0.985) and in the 
second stage we still find a negative and significant effect of financial depth on rural poverty 
suggesting that our results are mainly driven by cross-state variation rather than only time 
series variation (results available on request).28 
In summary, IV and OLS results suggest that higher levels of financial depth are associated 
with a lower incidence and depth of rural poverty but not with incidence or depth of urban 
 
28 We similarly find that averaging data five years before and after 1989 provides a negative but insignificant 
coefficient on branch penetration. In all cases, the IV specification tests still hold.  
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poverty. Financial outreach, as gauged by branch penetration, is not significantly associated 
with lower poverty level unless we consider a longer sample period including the period 
before the social banking policy. Our results suggest that financial deepening is more robustly 
related to poverty reduction than financial outreach in recent periods and hence we focus on 
financial depth for the rest of the paper. We next turn to the channels and mechanisms 
through which financial deepening is related to poverty reduction.  
4. Finance and poverty: channels 
So far, the results have provided evidence that financial deepening since the liberalization in 
1991 has helped reduce rural poverty in India. However, understanding the underlying 
channels is as important for policymakers who try to maximize the benefits of financial 
development. In this section, we explore different channels through which financial 
development helped reduce rural poverty. Specifically, we explore whether financial depth 
helped reduce rural poverty by enabling more entrepreneurship, by fostering human capital 
accumulation, or by enhancing migration and reallocation across sectors.  
4.1. Financial depth and entrepreneurship 
Theory and empirics have shown that financial imperfections represent particularly severe 
impediments to poor individuals opening their own businesses for two key reasons: (i) the 
poor have comparatively little collateral and (ii) the fixed costs of borrowing are relatively 
high for the poor (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; De Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008). 
The microfinance movement has been built on the premise that enabling the poor to become 
entrepreneurs will allow them to pull themselves out of poverty.  
To assess whether higher entrepreneurship among the poor can account for the significant 
relationship between financial depth and rural poverty identified in section 3, we test whether 
financial depth, instrumented by the demand for and efficiency of specialized courts can 
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explain reduction in poverty among different occupational groups. Specifically, we 
distinguish between (i) self-employed in agriculture, (ii) self-employed in non-agriculture, 
(iii) agricultural labor, (iv) other labor and (v) a residual group, which comprises 
economically non-active population not fitting in the above categories. While we focus our 
discussion on IV regressions, our findings are robust to using OLS regressions. We focus on 
rural areas since this is where we found a negative and significant relationship between 
financial depth and poverty in the previous section. 
Insert Table 6 here 
The results in Table 6 show that Credit to SDP is negatively and significantly associated with 
the Headcount and the Poverty Gap among the rural self-employed in agriculture and the 
Poverty Gap in non-agriculture, as well with Headcount among rural and agricultural labor. 
Financial depth does not enter significantly in any of the other regressions.29  Notably, 
financial deepening cannot explain variation in Headcount or Poverty Gap among non-
agricultural laborers.  Together, these results suggest financial deepening after the 
liberalization in the 1990s was associated with a reduction in both the share of the poor and 
the poverty gap in the population segment of self-employed in the rural areas. Overall, this 
provides some evidence for the entrepreneurship channel, as the reduction in poverty rates 
fell on self-employed.30  
 
29 In unreported regressions (available on request) we also look into the share of each occupational group in total 
population and find that Credit to SDP is positively associated only with the share of self-employed in 
agriculture. In addition, we find no relation between Credit to SDP and Headcount and Poverty Gap among the 
urban self-employed in agriculture or non-agriculture. 
30 Robustness tests including branch penetration yield similar findings for credit depth, while the financial sector 
outreach measure does not enter significantly in any of the regressions. However, when we split outreach into 
rural and urban branches, we see a weak association (significant at 10% level) between rural branches per capita 
and entrepreneurship.  Furthermore, in unreported robustness tests (available on request) we confirm these 
findings using the orthogonalized measures of Credit/SDP and branches per capita (net of the respective other 
financial development variables). 
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4.2. Financial depth and human capital accumulation 
Financial imperfections in conjunction with the high cost of schooling represent particularly 
pronounced barriers to the poor purchasing education, perpetuating income inequality (Galor 
and Zeira, 1993). An extensive empirical literature has shown a relationship between access 
to finance and child labor, both using country-specific household data31 and cross-country 
comparisons (Flug, Spilimbergo and Wachtenheim, 1998). Theory and previous empirical 
evidence would thus suggest that financial reforms that ease financial market imperfections 
will reduce income inequality and poverty levels by allowing talented, but poor, individuals 
to borrow and purchase education or parents to send their children to school rather than 
forcing them to earn money to contribute to family income. We test these hypotheses with 
our data focusing on different educational segments of the rural population across Indian 
states and gauge whether financial deepening is associated with an increase in the educational 
attainment in rural India. Specifically, we distinguish between (i) illiterates, (ii) population 
with primary education, (iii) population with middle school education and (iv) population 
with high school degree or higher. Unlike in the previous regressions, we also test for longer-
run trends by running regressions with five and ten-year lags. Financial sector deepening that 
results in more human capital accumulation cannot be expected to have an effect immediately 
but rather after a certain time lag.  Testing for the relationship across different lag structures 
also allows gauging whether any significant relationship is spurious or not. 
Insert Table 7 here 
The results in Table 7 do not show any consistent and significant impact of financial 
deepening on human capital allocation.  The regression results do not show any increase in 
 
31 Specifically, survey data for Peru suggest that lack of access to credit reduces the likelihood that poor 
households send their children to school (Jacoby, 1994), while studies for Guatemala, India and Tanzania point 
to households without access to finance as being more likely to reduce their children’s school attendance and 
increase their labor if they suffer transitory income shocks compared to household with more assets (Guarcello, 
Mealli and Rosati, 2010; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti, 2007). 
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educational attainment, either immediately or after a five- or 10-year lag from financial 
deepening. Rather, we find that the five-year lag of Bank Credit to SDP is positively and 
significantly associated with the share of illiterates, while it is negatively and significantly 
associated with the share of population with an education up to primary school. Overall, these 
results suggest that while the five-year lag of credit has a weak positive effect on the share of 
illiterates, it also has a weak negative effect on the share of the uneducated population.32,33 
4.3. Financial depth, migration and reallocation across sectors 
In a world with perfect factor mobility, workers and entrepreneurs would migrate to regions 
or sectors with better opportunities. Market frictions, however, might prevent such 
reallocation. Financial deepening can thus also contribute to poverty alleviation by helping 
households move to areas and sectors with higher earnings opportunities. Gine and Townsend 
(2004) show that financial liberalization in Thailand resulted in migration flows from rural 
subsistence agriculture into urban salaried employment and ultimately in lower poverty 
levels, while Beck, Levine and Levkov (2010) show that financial liberalization in the U.S. in 
the 1970s and 80s helped tighten income distribution by pulling previously unemployed and 
less educated into the formal labor market. In both countries, financial liberalization 
broadened opportunities for entrepreneurs, both incumbent and new ones, who in turn hired 
more workers. Applying the same argument to the Indian context, we should therefore 
observe an increase in migration with financial deepening and sectoral reallocation of labor.  
As we want to gauge whether finance provided enough incentives for migration within India, 
we obtain migration data from the NSS surveys for the following years – 1983, 1987-88, 
 
32 In unreported regressions, we also limited our sample to children below the age of 18 years to gauge whether 
financial deepening increases schooling and thus literacy in this specific group and find no effect. Results are 
available on request. We also confirm these insignificant findings using the orthogonalized measures of 
Credit/SDP and branches per capita (net of the respective other financial development variables) and using rural 
rather than total branches per capita. 
33 In unreported robustness tests (available on request) we confirm these findings using the orthogonalized 
measures of Credit/SDP and branches per capita (net of the respective other financial development variables) 
and using rural rather than total branches per capita. 
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1993, 1999-00, and 2007-08. These surveys have comprehensive data on migration including 
data on household migration, characteristics of migrants, years since migration, whether they 
are short-term migrants or out-migrants,34 reasons for migration, employment type and the 
sector from and into which they migrate. We divide households in each state in each year into 
six groups based on region (rural or urban) and occupational sector (primary, secondary, or 
tertiary) and measure the ratio of each group to total population. For simpler interpretation, 
we do not count households who are unemployed or did not report their occupation, so the 
sum of the ratios is not equal to one.35  
As a first step, we present summary statistics on migration in India in panel A of Table 8. The 
migration rate is computed as the ratio of the estimated number of households that migrated 
to state s in year t to the estimated total number of households in state s and year t. Intra-state 
migration is computed as the fraction of people who migrated within the state, either between 
or within the districts and inter-state migration is computed as the fraction of people 
migrating from another state to this state. For each year, we used the closest survey to 
estimate the rates. Specifically, we used round 38 in 1983 for estimating the rates in 1980-82, 
round 43 in 1987 for estimating the rates in 1983-86, round 49 in 1993 for estimating the 
rates in 1987-92, round 55 in 1999 for estimating the rates in 1993-98, and round 64 in 2007 
for estimating the rates in 1999-2005. The estimations start from 1980 because if the 
migration occurred further past the survey year, it is usually not reported precisely. For 
instance, immigrants from over 10 years ago tend to report years since migration as multiples 
of five or ten, creating a peak in migration rate of those years.  
 
34 Short-term migrants are persons who had stayed away from the village/town for a period ≥1 month but ≤ 6 
months during the past year for employment. Out-migrants are former members of a household who left the 
household any time in the past to stay outside the village/town (and are still alive on the date of survey). 




The data show that, while overall migration, both inter- and intra-state, is at 1.4 percent of a 
state’s population, on average, per year, it is dominated by intra-state migration, which 
constitutes about 80 percent of overall migration. Assuming one migration per household, 
during the period 1983-2005, around 30% of population experienced a migration.36 When we 
look at the migration between rural and urban sectors, we find that, as expected, urban to 
rural migration is the smallest and accounts for an average of 0.15% of total population 
through the years. Rural to urban migration is the highest though we find that there is 
comparable amount of migration from urban to urban areas and since 2000, there has also 
been a comparable share of rural to rural migration. When we look at occupational sectors, 
we find that migration into the tertiary sector has been the largest. In unreported charts of 
migration trends over time, we find that while the primary sector used to be smallest target 
sector, it overtook the secondary sector in most years after financial liberalization 
Next, we explore the finance and migration channel in more detail with regression analysis. 
In panel B of Table 8, we regress overall migration, intra-state, and inter-state migration on 
Credit to SDP, instrumented by the post-establishment demand for and efficiency of 
specialized DRTs, including our other control variables. To be consistent with the benchmark 
regression we estimate it for the period 1983-2005. Panel B shows that while financial 
deepening is not significantly associated with overall migration or intra-state migration, there 
is a significant (at the 10% level) impact of financial deepening on inter-state migration. The 
economic size of this effect is reasonable, with one demeaned standard deviation in Credit to 
SDP explaining around 16 percent of variation in demeaned variation of inter-state 
migration.37,38  In the following, we therefore focus on inter-state migration. Specifically, we 
 
36 In the migration surveys only the earliest migration is reported. The number is computed as 1.373×22=30.2. 
37 The demeaned standard errors of credit and inter-state migration are 0.049 and 0.001 respectively, so the 
number will be 0.049*0.0032/0.001= 0.157. If we run the same regression including both Credit/GDP and 
Branch penetration, the same result hold for financial depth and there is a significant (at the 10% level) and 
negative impact of branch penetration on inter-state migration. We find no significant effect of Branch 
34 
 
use household-level data for inter-state migrants to gauge the impact of financial 
development on (i) sectoral migration decisions and (ii) reasons for migration. We have data 
available for around 28,000 inter-state migrant households across the four surveys described 
above.  
Insert Tables 8 and 9 here 
In Table 9 we focus on inter-state migration and explore how financial development 
influences migration into different occupational sectors – primary, secondary, and tertiary. 
Migrant households can choose between six alternatives – rural primary, rural secondary, 
rural tertiary, urban primary, urban secondary, and urban tertiary sectors which we group by 
geographic area (rural or urban). Thus, the tree structure of a migrant’s decision would be as 
follows:39 
  Migration 
Rural      Urban 
Primary    Secondary    Tertiary                  Primary    Secondary    Tertiary 
We estimate our model as sequential logit model, first testing to what extent the decision to 
move into urban or rural areas depends on differences in Credit to SDP across origin and 
destination states and, second, gauging whether the decision to work in the primary, 
secondary or tertiary sector depends on these differences and controlling for the decision to 
move into the rural or urban area. We thus focus on differences in financial development and 
 
Penetration on overall migration. Thus, while higher financial depth in a state thus results in higher migration 
into the states from other states, higher branch penetration has the opposite effect. 
38 When we include our financial outreach variables, neither branch nor rural branch penetration enter 
significantly. The results hold when we use the orthogonalized Credit/SDP, i.e., financial depth net of branch 
penetration.   
39 In robustness tests, available on request, we reverse the sequence, with the three sectors as the first decision 
and rural/urban as the second decision. We also run a multinomial regression with all six options.  Both 
specifications confirm our main conclusions.  
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other state-level variables here rather than levels at the year of migration. Hence, we compare 
the level of variables between the destination and origin states when the households decided 
to migrate. We also control for two household characteristics, household size and per capita 
expenditure, that might influence migration decisions.  We also control whether the migrant 
household used to live in an urban or rural area.  
Table 9 shows that financial depth is significantly associated with inter-state migration flows 
into the rural primary and urban tertiary sectors. The results in columns 1 show that a higher 
difference in Credit to SDP between destination and origin state increases the likelihood that 
migrants move into urban areas though this is not statistically significant.  We also find that a 
higher difference in SDP per capita and government expenditure and a lower difference in 
literacy is associated with a higher likelihood of inter-state migrants moving into urban areas. 
In addition, richer and smaller migrant households coming from urban areas are more likely 
to move into urban areas in the destination state.  Considering interstate migrants into urban 
areas, we find that a higher difference in Credit to SDP between destination and origin states 
is associated with a higher likelihood that migrants allocate into the tertiary sector and a 
lower likelihood that migrants allocate into the secondary sector. We also find that interstate 
migrants into the rural areas are more likely to allocate into the primary sector, the higher the 
difference in Credit to SDP between origin and destination state.  Thus, the primary rural 
sector and the urban tertiary sector were the sectors that benefitted most from the inter-state 
migration associated with financial deepening.  
 In Appendix Table A8 we also gauge whether differences in financial depth across states 
explains specific reasons for inter-state migration. We find that a higher difference in Credit 
to SDP between destination and origin states is associated with a higher share of migrants 
that state “search for employment”, “under transfer”, and “parents migration” as reason for 
migration and a lower share of migrants that state “search for better employment” as reason 
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for migration. When focusing on migrants below the poverty line in Appendix table A9, 
“search for employment” is the only significant reason associated with state-level differences 
in Credit/SDP.  
4.4. Sectoral credit and reallocation across sectors 
In a final step, we relate the relationship between financial deepening and geographic-sectoral 
migration trends to the sectoral credit portfolio of the Indian banking system.  Specifically, 
which sector drives the cross-state variation in financial deepening observed after the 1991 
liberalization? And can we link this through to the poverty-reducing effect in rural areas 
documented in section 3?  
Figure 10 shows the trends of sector-wise Credit to SDP over time. For this purpose, we 
construct Credit to SDP measure in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors by dividing 
RBI’s sector-wise credit data with the corresponding net state domestic product in that sector. 
The detail of the source and construction of these measures are described in Appendix B. It 
can be clearly seen that Credit to SDP in the tertiary sector started to grow sharply in the late 
1990s, but this pattern does not exist in the other sectors and there is even a downward trend 
in credit to the secondary sector.  
Insert Figure 10 and Table 10 here 
In Table 10, we replicate the Table 5 regressions, using tertiary Credit to SDP rather than 
overall Credit to SDP, instrumented by the post-implementation demand for specialized 
DRTs.40 Our Table 5 results are confirmed using this sectoral credit measure. Tertiary Credit 
to SDP enters negatively and significantly in the regressions of Rural Headcount and Rural 
Poverty Gap, but not in the regressions of the Urban Headcount or Poverty Gap. As in Table 
 
40 In Appendix Table A8, using the same model as in Table 3, we find that it is only tertiary credit that is 
associated with the demand for specialized DRTs. Not surprisingly, primary credit to SDP (and thus rural credit) 
is significantly associated with trend breaks of the rural branching program, while neither credit to the secondary 
nor credit to the tertiary sector are.  
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5, branch penetration does not enter significantly. The coefficient sizes of Tertiary Credit to 
SDP are only slightly smaller than those of overall Credit to SDP in Table 5.  
While we provide statistically and economically strong evidence on the relationship between 
financial deepening, geographic-sectoral migration trends and reductions in poverty rates, we 
have to be careful in our interpretation.  Our results do not imply that the increase in credit to 
the tertiary sector is purely supply-driven. Rather, we interpret our findings as suggesting that 
financial deepening has supported growth opportunities in the tertiary sector by providing 
credit to enterprises in this sector, which in turn through labor market effects resulted in the 
geographic-sectoral migration documented above.  
5. Conclusion 
Using state-level indicators on financial depth, branch penetration and poverty for 1983 to 
2005 across 15 Indian states, we show a negative relationship between financial deepening 
post-1991 and rural poverty. Exploring different channels, we find evidence that the poverty 
reduction effects of financial deepening fell on the self-employed in rural areas. We also find 
evidence that financial liberalization resulted in inter-state migration towards states with 
deeper financial systems, benefitting the rural primary and urban tertiary sectors.  Together, 
these results suggest two related effects of financial deepening in rural areas: fostering 
entrepreneurship and migration of the poorest towards financially more developed states. 
Consistent with the migration trend into the urban tertiary sector we also find that the pro-
poor effects of financial deepening are associated with credit to the tertiary sector only.  
Our findings suggest that financial deepening can have important structural effects, including 
through structural reallocation and migration, with consequences for poverty reduction. The 
pro-poor effects of financial development are multi-faceted and can arise through different 
channels.  There is some evidence that financial development can reduce poverty through 
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fostering entrepreneurship, although this does not necessarily happen through more inclusive 
but rather more efficient systems. We also show that financial deepening can result in 
important labor market and migration effects. On the other hand, we cannot find significant 
evidence for a human capital channel of financial deepening on poverty reduction.  
Our paper has important policy repercussions. The pro-poor effects of financial deepening do 
not necessarily come just through more inclusive financial systems, but can also come 
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Figure 1- Rural and urban poverty in India over time  
This figure shows the trend in Rural and Urban Headcount ratios in India. Rural and Urban Headcount 
ratios are the percentage of rural and urban population with monthly per capita expenditure less than 
the official poverty line respectively. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix 
table A1. 
 
Figure 2- Decomposition of bank branches and total credit based on ownership. 
This figure shows the percentage of total bank branches and total bank credit by bank ownership over time. The 
decomposition of credit based on ownership is not available earlier that 2001. As of 2013, of 89 commercial 
banks, 26 were public sector banks (20 nationalized banks and 6 State Bank of India and its Associates), 20 
were domestic private sector banks, and 43 were foreign banks. Non-commercial banks includes 56 regional 
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Figure 3- Decomposition of bank branches and total credit based on location. 
This figure shows the percentage of total bank branches and total bank credit by location over time. The 
decomposition of credit based on location is not available earlier that 1991.  
 
Figure 4- Credit to SDP in India over time  
This figure shows the trend in the percentage of total commercial bank credit outstanding to net state domestic 
product. Commercial bank credit comprises term loans, cash credit, overdrafts and bills purchased and 
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Figure 5- Bank branches per capita in India over time  
This figure shows the trend in the ratio of commercial bank branches over population (in million). The rural 
branch expansion program was in place up to 1989. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the 
Appendix table A1.  
 
 
Figure 6- DRT establishment across India 
This figure shows the timing of DRT establishment across different states of India. The tribunal of Delhi is 
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Figure 7 - DRT demand across India 
This figure shows the total number of cases filed in the first year of establishment divided by the population (in 
millions) the tribunal covers. The sources of the variables are in the appendix. 
 
 
Figure 8- Financial depth and breadth and DRT establishment 
The bars show the difference in credit/SDP between states above and below of the median of DRT cases per 
capita in the first year of establishment. For better illustration the bars are referenced by the year of DRT 
establishment in which the difference is 20.44. The connected line shows the difference in branches per capita 











Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh (Jabalpur) = 0.059
Bihar, Orissa (Patna) = 0.082
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Assam (Guwahati) = 0.565
West Bengal (Kolkata) = 0.842
Gujarat (Ahmedabad) = 1.166
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The bar shows the difference in credit/SDP between states above and below of the median of DRT cases per captia in the first year of
establishment. For better illustration the bar are referenced by the year of DRT establishment. The connected line show the difference in
branches per capita between states above and below of the median of DRT cases per captia  in the first year of establishment.
The difference between states below and above median of DRT latent demand
Financial depth and breadth and DRT establishment
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Figure 9 - Year effects of initial financial development on branch penetration 
This figure plots the ηk coefficients obtained from the regression, Branchesit = η0 + η1 (Bi60×D60) + η2 (Bi60×D61) 
+ … + η41 (Bi60×D05) + si + yt + εit where Dt equals 1 in year t and zero otherwise, Bi60 is the initial level (in 
1960) of financial development as measured by the number of branches per capita in that state, and si and yt are 
state and year dummies. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix table A1.       
 
 
Figure 10- Sectoral credit to SDP in India over time 
This figure shows the trends in sector-wise credit to SDP. The primary sector consists of agriculture, fishing, 
forestry, mining and quarrying; the secondary sector is composed of manufacturing, construction, electricity, gas 
and water; and the tertiary sector is all services including trade, hotels and restaurants, transport, 
communication, storage, banking, insurance, real estate, ownership of dwelling, business services, public 
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Time period: 1960-2005
Note: The coefficients are referenced and normalized by the first one.
The level of initial finacial development is measured by branches per capita in 1960.
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Table 1- Summary statistics 
Mean and standard deviation of the main variables across all of India over the period 1983-2005. Three additional standard deviations are measured: within state which is 
standard deviation of (xsy – ms) where ms is the average value of x in state s over the sample period, within year which is the standard deviation of (xsy – my) where my is the 





Table 2- Correlation table  
This table presents pair-wise correlation coefficients between the main variables. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix table A1. *, **, and *** 



















exp. To SDP 
Literacy 
rate 
Rural Poverty gap 0.962*** 1         
Urban Headcount 0.714*** 0.717*** 1        
Urban Poverty gap 0.693*** 0.718*** 0.970*** 1       
Credit to SDP -0.248*** -0.198*** -0.0708 -0.0234 1      
Branches per capita -0.314*** -0.239*** -0.187*** -0.142*** 0.405*** 1     
SDP per capita -0.699*** -0.655*** -0.622*** -0.564*** 0.487*** 0.263*** 1    
Rural population 0.316*** 0.247*** 0.135** 0.112** -0.757*** -0.553*** -0.53*** 1   
Government 
exp./SDP -0.0823 -0.133** -0.112** -0.126** -0.0921* -0.206*** 0.0395 0.361*** 1  
Literacy rate -0.547*** -0.543*** -0.447*** -0.400*** 0.537*** 0.471*** 0.660*** -0.467** 0.174*** 1 




























Mean 31.935 7.521 25.890 6.515 26.962 74.100 8,781 74.487 19.274 55.981 1.417 
SD 14.898 4.685 12.076 3.882 14.387 18.732 6,897 8.555 41.173 14.083 2.250 
SD within state 12.064 3.937 8.647 2.838 7.274 3.832 6,096 1.977 3.362 9.088  
SD within year 10.044 3.125 9.423 3.062 13.334 18.515 4,023 8.401 3.611 10.954 2.250 
SD within state and year 4.946 1.822 4.210 1.535 4.869 2.568 2,404 1.140 2.633 2.061  
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Table 3- Finance, DRT and Branching Policy 
This table shows the first stage estimation of the Instrumental variable regressions in Table 5. The regression equation estimated is: Credit to SDP (or Branches per capita)it= 
a0 + β1 DRTit × number of DRT applications per million capita in the first year of establishment + β2 (year-1960) × B60 + β3 (year-1977) × B60 × D77 + β4 (year-1990) × B60 
× D90 + β5 Log (SDP per capita) it+ β6Literacy Rateit + β7Government exp./SDPit + β8 DRTit +si + yt + eit, where DRTit  is time dummy for DRT establishment, D77(90) is 
dummy for post 1977(1990),  B60 is No. bank branches/Mill. capita in 1960, si and yt are state and year dummies. Standard errors clustered at state and year level are in 
parentheses. AP-chi2 is Angrist and Pischke (2009) test of weak instruments. Weak ID test is Stock-Yogo weak identification test with critical values: 10% maximal LIML 
size=4.72 15%=3.39 20%=2.99 25%=2.79. *, **, and *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix table 
A1. 
 1982-2004 1964-2004 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Credit to 
SDP 
Branches  per 
capita 
Rural Branches  
per capita 
Urban Branches  
per capita 
Credit to SDP 
Branches  per 
capita 
DRT dummy × applications per capita 3.770*** 0.338 0.488* 0.035 4.125*** 0.140 
 (0.457) (0.211) (0.295) (0.041) (0.461) (0.296) 
(year-1960) × B60    
 0.062*** 0.271*** 
    
 (0.013) (0.064) 
(year-1977) × B60 × D77 -0.012 -0.141*** -0.091*** -0.043* -0.052*** -0.387*** 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.009) (0.061) 
(year-1990) × B60 × D90 0.079*** 0.140*** 0.075*** 0.045 0.027*** 0.133*** 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.023) (0.027) (0.007) (0.016) 
Constant 152.966*** 21.551 16.371 -8.128 83.994 -10.174 
 (25.161) (32.843) (20.836) (13.158) (56.889) (49.622) 
Observations 345 345 345 345 597 597 
R-squared 0.956 0.992 0.992 0.982 0.944 0.982 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AP-chi2 132.680 53.353 23.321 9.881 87.534 338.264 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 








Table 4- Finance and Poverty: OLS estimations  
The regression equation estimated is: Povertyit = a0 + β1Credit to SDPit + β2Branches per capitait + β6 Log (SDP per capita) it + β7Literacy rateit + β8Government exp./SDPit + si 
+ yt + eit where si and yt are state and year dummies. Poverty is one of four measures – Rural Headcount, Urban Headcount, Rural Poverty gap, and Urban Poverty gap. All 
explanatory variables are entered with one year lag. All regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares and with time-variant independent variables all lagged by one 
period. Standard errors clustered at state and year level are in parentheses. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix table A1. *, **, and *** shows 




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lag of Credit to SDP -0.103** -0.074*** -0.032 -0.028 -0.089*** -0.070*** -0.040 -0.032 
 
(0.047) (0.028) (0.073) (0.027) (0.034) (0.023) (0.077) (0.028) 
lag of Branches per capita -0.186 -0.081 -0.018 -0.021   
  
 
(0.211) (0.105) (0.127) (0.057)   
  
lag of Rural branches per capita     -0.456* -0.171*   
     (0.234) (0.095)   
lag of Urban branches per capita       0.502 0.183 
       (0.365) (0.176) 
lag of Log(SDP per capita) -1.589 0.386 -10.049** -2.859* -2.960 -0.099 0.502 0.183 
 
(6.195) (3.783) (5.022) (1.660) (6.114) (3.806) -10.095* -2.838 
lag of Literacy rate 0.330*** -0.021 0.410* 0.079 0.252* -0.044 (5.456) (1.874) 
 
(0.117) (0.120) (0.233) (0.088) (0.132) (0.120) 0.397* 0.083 
lag of Government exp./SDP -0.034 -0.011 -0.225* -0.081** -0.087 -0.029 (0.207) (0.081) 
 
(0.174) (0.072) (0.122) (0.041) (0.178) (0.073) -0.201 -0.069 
Constant 56.458 16.567 106.301*** 32.976*** 72.771 21.529 97.186** 28.166* 
 
(45.732) (32.223) (38.974) (11.558) (49.645) (32.514) (45.074) (15.350) 
Observations 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 
R-squared 0.896 0.857 0.890 0.852 0.899 0.861 0.892 0.854 






Table 5 - Finance and Poverty: Instrumental Variable results 
This table presents the second stage of instrumental variable regressions estimated by LIML method. The regression equation estimated is: Povertyit = a0 + β1Instrumented 
value of Credit to SDPit + β2 Instrumented value of Branches per capitait + β3 Log (SDP per capita) it + β4Literacy rateit + β5Government exp./SDPit + si + yt + eit where si and yt 
are state and year dummies. Poverty is one of four measures – Rural headcount, Urban headcount, Rural poverty gap, and Urban poverty gap. The instrumented values are 
obtained from first stage regressions in Table 3. All independent variables are lagged by one period. Standard errors clustered at state and year level are in parentheses. The 
definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix table A1. The OID test is the Hansen J statistic over-identification test of all instruments. *, **, and *** shows 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 1983-2005 1965-2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 







Rural Poverty gap 
lag of Credit to SDP -0.168** -0.082*** -0.135 -0.059 -0.152** -0.076*** -0.375** -0.160* 
 
(0.076) (0.028) (0.141) (0.045) (0.070) (0.028) (0.188) (0.084) 
lag of Branches per capita -0.271 -0.129 0.089 0.036   -0.332*** -0.127** 
 
(0.244) (0.119) (0.174) (0.095)   (0.076) (0.055) 
lag of Rural Branches per 
capita     -0.459 -0.195   
     (0.306) (0.153)   
lag of Log(SDP per capita) -2.016 0.233 -10.066** -2.794* -3.159 -0.217 -4.233 0.115 
 (5.256) (3.344) (4.539) (1.493) (5.197) (3.284) (10.263) (4.546) 
lag of Literacy rate 0.271** -0.048 0.446* 0.104 0.238* -0.055 0.412* 0.134 
 (0.124) (0.114) (0.233) (0.098) (0.141) (0.117) (0.242) (0.154) 
lag of Government exp./SDP -0.064 -0.023 -0.221** -0.074** -0.099 -0.035 0.197 0.060 
 (0.154) (0.060) (0.110) (0.035) (0.161) (0.061) (0.449) (0.172) 
Observations 345 345 345 345 345 345 597 597 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
OID test 0.935 0.260 0.451 0.033 0.839 0.193 1.195 0.983 





Table 6- Entrepreneurship channel  
This table presents the second stage of instrumental variable regressions estimated by LIML method. The regression equation estimated is: Rural Povertyit = a0 + 
β1Instrumented value of Credit to SDPit + β2 Log (SDP per capita) it + β3Literacy rateit + β4Government exp./SDPit + β5Rural populationit + si + yt + eit where si and yt are state 
and year dummies. Rural Poverty is one of two measures – Rural headcount and Rural poverty gap in each of 5 categories of rural household employment type: (i) self-
employed in agriculture, (ii) self-employed in non-agriculture, (iii) agricultural labor, (iv) other labor and (v) others, a residual group that comprises economically non-active 
population not fitting in the above categories. All explanatory variables are entered with one year lag. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix table 
A1. Weak ID test is Stock-Yogo weak identification test with critical values: 10% maximal LIML size=4.72 15%=3.39 20%=2.99 25%=2.79. *, **, and *** shows 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
rural & self-employed in 
non-agriculture 
rural & self-employed in 
agriculture 
rural & agricultural 
labor 
rural & other labor rural & others 
 
Headcount Poverty gap Headcount Poverty gap Headcount 
Poverty 
gap 
Headcount Poverty gap Headcount Poverty gap 
Lag of Credit to SDP -0.136 -0.080** -0.345** -0.143*** -0.227** -0.060 0.112 -0.014 0.241* 0.052  
(0.128) (0.032) (0.166) (0.049) (0.107) (0.062) (0.078) (0.043) (0.144) (0.053) 
Observations 299 298 294 297 298 299 297 298 296 297 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Weak ID test 119.549 118.951 118.978 119.231 119.072 119.885 119.027 119.369 118.005 117.450 
OID test 0.473 0.261 0.952 0.898 0.694 0.562 1.616 1.070 0.632 6.813 





Table 7- Education channel  
This table presents the second stage of instrumental variable regressions estimated by LIML method. The regression equation estimated is: Educationit = a0 + β1Instrumented 
value of Credit to SDPit + β2 Log (SDP per capita) it + β3Literacy rateit + β4Government exp./SDPit + β5Rural populationit + si + yt + eit where si and yt are state and year 
dummies. Education is the education segment of the rural population and is one of four variables – proportion of illiterates, proportion of population with primary education, 
proportion of population with middle school education, and proportion of population with high school degree or higher. All explanatory variables are entered with one year 
lag unless specified otherwise. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix table A1. Weak ID test is Stock-Yogo weak identification test with critical 
values: 10% maximal LIML size=4.72 15%=3.39 20%=2.99 25%=2.79. *, **, and *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Proportion of illiterates (%) Proportion of up to primary (%) Proportion of middle school (%) Proportion of High school & above (%) 
lag of Credit to SDP 0.115***   -0.114   0.037   -0.032   
 (0.033)   (0.100)   (0.027)   (0.058)   
5 years lag of Credit to SDP  0.383*   -0.402*   0.020   0.008  
 
 (0.230)   (0.218)   (0.025)   (0.258)  
10 years lag of Credit to SDP   -1.283   -6.231   9.963   4.374 
 
  (3.517)   (35.453)   (415.613)   (9.524) 
Observations 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 
Control YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
WeakID test 109.359 14.010 0.288 109.359 14.010 0.288 109.359 14.010 0.288 109.359 14.010 0.288 
OID test 1.361 0.169 1.466 2.584 4.984 0.323 2.111 1.616 0.073 3.369 2.506 0.029 


















Table 8- Financial deepening and migration  
Panel A presents summary statistics of the migration variables. All variables are in percentage terms. Standard errors are computed similar to panel A of Table 1. Panel B 
presents second stage of instrumental variables estimated by LIML method. The regression equation is Migration rate/Intra-state migration/Inter-state migrationit = 
β1Instrumented value of Credit to SDPit + β2 Log (SDP per capita) it + β3Literacy rateit + β4Government exp./SDPit + β5Rural populationit + si + yt + eit where si and yt are state 
and year dummies. All explanatory variables are entered with one year lag. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix table A1. Weak ID test is Stock-
Yogo weak identification test with critical values: 10% maximal LIML size=4.72 15%=3.39 20%=2.99 25%=2.79. *, **, and *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level 
 
























Mean 1.373 1.093 0.292 0.363 0.490 0.147 0.401 0.219 0.257 0.517 
SD 0.669 0.592 0.241 0.224 0.271 0.103 0.229 0.135 0.198 0.317 
SD within state 0.529 0.445 0.150 0.167 0.224 0.0890 0.183 0.110 0.157 0.270 
SD within year 0.508 0.477 0.224 0.193 0.217 0.0890 0.187 0.118 0.160 0.223 




Panel B: IV results   
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Migration rate (%) Intrastate (%) Interstate (%) 
Lag of Credit to SDP -0.0029 -0.0059 0.0032*  
(0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0018) 
Observations 345 344 330 
Control YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Weak ID test 130.7757 130.2100 123.1073 
OID test 4.3150 2.0863 2.8783 




Table 9- Financial deepening and inter-state migration, sequential logit estimation. 
This table presents sequential logit regressions for inter-state immigrants. The regression equation is Yk,i,t = β1Diff [Credit to SDP)i,t] + β2Diff[Log (SDP per capita) it] + 
β3Diff[Literacy rateit]+ β4Diff[Government exp./SDPit]+ β5Diff[Rural populationit]+ si + yt + eit where si and yt are state and year dummies. Y is a vector of dummy variables 
taking on value one if household k migrates to an urban area, into the primary, secondary and tertiary sector. Column 1 presents a logit regressions, columns (2) to (4) and 
columns (5) to (7) present multinominal regressions.  Diff indicates the difference between destination and origin (= destination - origin). All explanatory variables are 
entered with one year lag. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix table A1. The reported coefficients are marginal effects and multiplied by 100 for 
better illustration. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix table A1. *, **, and *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 




rural after migration urban after migration 
 
Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Lag of difference in Credit to SDP 0.003 0.178*** -0.089* -0.088* -0.040 -0.211*** 0.252***  
(0.029) (0.061) (0.046) (0.049) (0.027) (0.045) (0.046) 
Lag of difference in SDP per capita 11.152*** -3.455 5.059** -1.604 2.479** 18.072*** -20.551***  
(1.196) (2.713) (2.044) (2.230) (1.164) (2.044) (2.108) 
Lag of difference in Literacy Rate -0.112*** -0.240*** 0.046 0.193*** 0.017 -0.126*** 0.109**  
(0.028) (0.060) (0.046) (0.048) (0.028) (0.047) (0.048) 
Lag of difference in Rural population -0.893*** 0.286** -0.174* -0.112 0.099 -0.132 0.033  
(0.062) (0.136) (0.104) (0.111) (0.061) (0.107) (0.109) 
Lag of difference in Government expenditures/SDP 0.296*** 0.395* -0.089 -0.306* 0.145 0.587*** -0.732***  
(0.091) (0.213) (0.159) (0.174) (0.090) (0.156) (0.161) 
Monthly per capita expenditure 0.07317*** -4.406*** 0.659 3.747*** -3.309*** 0.055 3.254***  
(0.417) (0.953) (0.695) (0.683) (0.454) (0.519) (0.543) 
Household size -2.593*** 2.282*** -1.288*** -0.994*** 0.808*** -1.522*** 0.714***  
(0.090) (0.239) (0.194) (0.201) (0.106) (0.216) (0.217) 
rural=0/urban=1 before migration 17.906*** -11.723*** 3.846*** 7.877*** -2.822*** -6.394*** 9.216***  
(0.547) (1.312) (1.013) (1.082) (0.605) (1.047) (1.054) 




Table 10- Poverty and Tertiary sector credit. 
This table presents the second stage of instrumental variable regressions estimated by LIML method. The regression equation estimated is: Povertyit = a0 + β1Instrumented 
value of Tertiary Credit to SDPit + β2 Instrumented value of Branches per capitait + β3 Log (SDP per capita) it + β4Literacy rateit + β5Government exp./SDPit + β6Rural 
populationit + si + yt + eitwhere si and yt are state and year dummies. Poverty is one of four measures – Rural headcount, Urban headcount, Rural poverty gap, and Urban 
poverty gap. The instrumented values are obtained from first stage regressions similar to Table 3. All independent variables are lagged by one period. Standard errors 
clustered at state and year level are in parentheses. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix table A1. The OID test is the Hansen J statistic over-
identification test of all instruments. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Rural Headcount Rural Poverty gap Urban Headcount Urban Poverty gap 
lag of Tertiary Credit to SDP -0.116* -0.058** -0.040 -0.028  
(0.060) (0.026) (0.073) (0.029) 
lag of Branches per capita -0.161 -0.087 0.044 0.067  
(0.175) (0.076) (0.059) (0.059) 
Observations 270 270 270 270 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
FixedEffects YES YES YES YES 
OID test 0.559 0.099 0.394 0.072 









Web Appendix A1: Variable Definitions and Source  
Variable Source Definition 
Rural Headcount 
Authors' calculation using 
NSSO surveys + Datt et al 
(1996) 
Proportion of the population below the poverty line in rural areas 
Rural Poverty gap Mean distance of the poor from the poverty line --normalized by poverty line-- in rural areas 
Urban Headcount Proportion of the population below the poverty line in urban areas 
Urban Poverty gap Mean distance of the poor from the poverty line --normalized by poverty line-- in urban areas 
Credit to SDP 
Burgess & Pande (2005)  + 
Besley & Burgess (2004) + 
updates from the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI) 
(http://dbie.rbi.org.in) 
Credit given by scheduled commercial banks over net state domestic product. Credit data is taken from 
Burgess & Pande (2005) till 2000 and updated to 2005 using RBI’s data. Net state domestic product is 
provided in Besely & Burgess (2004) till 2002 and is available at EOPP website. For the remaining 
years it is updated using RBI’s data.  
Branches per capita 
RBI’s publications 
“Directory of Bank Offices” 
(http://dbie.rbi.org.in) 
Number of back branches per million persons.  
SDP per capita 
LSE Economic Organisation 
and Public Policy 
Programme Indian States 
Database (EOPP) + updates 
from RBI 
(http://dbie.rbi.org.in) 
Net state domestic product per person. 
Rural population 
EOPP + updates from 
Indian census 
Share of rural population to total. Constructed using census data from the five censuses for 1961, 1971, 
1981, 1991, 2001.  Between any two successive censuses, the state-sectoral populations are assumed to 
grow at a constant rate, derived from the respective census population totals.  
Government exp. / SDP 
EOPP + updates from RBI 
(http://dbie.rbi.org.in) 
Total state government expenditures over net state domestic product 
Literacy rate 
EOPP + updates from 
Indian census 
Proportion of persons who can both read and write in any language among population aged 7 years and 
above.  Constructed using census data from the five censuses for 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001.  
Between any two successive censuses, the state-sectoral populations are assumed to grow at a constant 
rate, derived from the respective census population totals.  
DRT cases per capita  http://drt.gov.in  Number of DRT application in the first year of establishment. Population data is drawn from EOPP 
Credit/SDP -Primary sector 
RBI’s publications “Basic 
Statistical Returns of 
Banks” and “Banking 
Credit given by scheduled commercial banks to the primary sector over net state domestic product of 
primary sector (agriculture, fishing, forestry, mining and quarrying). The data is from RBI’s online 





annual basis under the heading Occupation-wise Classification of Credit, but not available for the full 
sample period and has some missing value in between. The classification of occupation is different from 
NSDP, so we divide them to three main groups to construct the depth measures: primary (agriculture, 
mining and quarrying), secondary (industry excluding mining and quarrying, electricity, gas, and water) 
and tertiary (the rest minus personal loans). 
Credit/SDP -Secondary sector 
RBI’s publications “Basic 
Statistical Returns of 
Banks” and “Banking 
Statistics 1972-2002” 
(http://dbie.rbi.org.in) 
Credit given by scheduled commercial banks to the secondary sector over net state domestic product of 
secondary sector (manufacturing, construction, electricity, gas and water). The classification of 
occupation is different from NSDP, so we divide them to three main groups to construct the depth 
measures: primary (agriculture, mining and quarrying), secondary (industry excluding mining and 
quarrying, electricity, gas, and water) and tertiary (the rest minus personal loans). 
Credit/SDP -Tertiary sector 
RBI’s publications “Basic 
Statistical Returns of 
Banks” and “Banking 
Statistics 1972-2002” 
(http://dbie.rbi.org.in) 
Credit given by scheduled commercial banks to the tertiary sector over net state domestic product of 
tertiary sector (trade, hotels and restaurants, transport, communication, storage, banking, insurance, real 
estate, ownership of dwelling, business services, public administration, and other services). The 
classification of occupation is different from NSDP, so we divide them to three main groups to 
construct the depth measures: primary (agriculture, mining and quarrying), secondary (industry 
excluding mining and quarrying, electricity, gas, and water) and tertiary (the rest minus personal loans). 
Rural & self-employed in non-
agriculture HC 
Authors' calculation using 
NSSO surveys  
Proportion of the population below the poverty line among self-employed in non-agriculture in rural 
areas 
Rural & self-employed in 
agriculture HC 
Proportion of the population below the poverty line among self-employed in agriculture in rural areas 
Rural & agricultural labor HC Proportion of the population below the poverty line among agricultural labors in rural areas 
Rural & other labor HC Proportion of the population below the poverty line among other labors in rural areas 
Rural & other HC 
Proportion of the population below the poverty line among non-active population which not fitting in 
the above four categories in rural areas 
Proportion of illiterates 
Authors' calculation using 
NSSO surveys 
Share of illiterates in total population 
Proportion of up to primary Share of literate people who at most have a primary school degree in total population 
Proportion of middle school Share of people who have a middle school degree in total population 
Migration rate 
Ratio of the number of households that migrated to state s in year t to the total number of households 
sampled in state s. 
Intra-state migration 
Ratio of the number of households that migrated to state s in year t from the same states to the total 
number of households sampled in state s. 
Inter-state migration 
Ratio of the number of households that migrated to state s in year t from other states to the total number 
of households sampled in state s. 
Migration from rural to rural 
Ratio of the number of households that migrated to rural areas of state s in year t from rural areas 
(either the same state or not) to the total number of households sampled in state s. 
3 
 
Migration from rural to urban 
Ratio of the number of households that migrated to urban areas of state s in year t from rural areas 
(either the same state or not) to the total number of households sampled in state s. 
Migration from urban to rural 
Ratio of the number of households that migrated to rural areas of state s in year t from urban areas 
(either the same state or not) to the total number of households sampled in state s. 
Migration from urban to urban 
Ratio of the number of households that migrated to urban areas of state s in year t from urban areas 
(either the same state or not) to the total number of households sampled in state s. 
Migration to primary 
Ratio of the number of households that migrated to primary sector of state s in year t to the total number 
of households sampled in state s. 
Migration to secondary 
Ratio of the number of households that migrated to secondary sector of state s in year t to the total 
number of households sampled in state s. 
Migration to tertiary 
Ratio of the number of households that migrated to tertiary sector of state s in year t to the total number 
of households sampled in state s. 
Reason for migration 
NSSO migration surveys 
Reason for migration of immigrants is one of the following categories: search for employment, search 
for better employment, under transfer, studies, marriage, parents migration, political problems, others. 
Household size Number of person in the household 
Monthly per capita expenditure  Monthly expenditure of household over household size 
Development exp./SDP EOPP + updates from RBI State government development expenditures over net state domestic product 
Trade openness Marjit et al (2007) 
A time varying index to measure the openness of states to trade with other countries. It is available from 
1980 to 2002. 
Labor regulation Gupta et al (2009) 
States are divided into flexible, neutral, and inflexible labor regulation. The categories are based on 
Besley and Burgess (2004). 




Unit cost of electric power supply in Paise/kwh. The data is drawn from two reports on the working of 
state electricity boards and electricity department (2001-02 and 2011-12), prepared by Planning 
Commission, (Power & Energy Division), Government of India. The first report in 2001-2 includes data 
between 1974 and 2001 and the second one covers 2007-2010. For 2002-2006 we generate data using 
linear interpolation. 
Road density 
Ghosh & Prabir (2005), 
+ updates from CSO 
Total length of roads in km per 1000 km2. It includes both surfaced and unsurfaced roads. Data is 
available in Ghosh & Prabir (2005) for 1990-96. Updates for 1998-2008 are drawn from infrastructure 
statistics published by Central Statistical Organization (CSO) and available at: 































                
Rural Headcount 25.489 37.410 49.461 29.235 19.889 35.740 24.965 38.587 39.160 35.891 14.115 38.840 33.703 32.820 23.719 
 (10.169) (13.892) (14.827) (11.819) (10.840) (13.995) (13.424) (11.124) (13.936) (11.209) (6.979) (11.951) (14.915) (10.118) (12.892) 
 
               
Rural Poverty gap 5.574 7.845 12.567 6.350 4.371 8.917 5.951 9.528 10.223 8.329 2.410 9.975 8.330 7.484 4.956 
 (2.574) (3.408) (5.712) (3.383) (2.739) (4.777) (3.804) (3.980) (4.960) (3.789) (1.465) (4.805) (5.319) (3.324) (3.980) 
 
               
Urban Headcount 27.744 11.631 33.704 28.181 14.899 26.261 24.071 37.584 30.906 37.938 9.784 23.467 29.721 32.488 19.964 
 (8.015) (7.455) (7.844) (11.755) (7.185) (9.684) (12.890) (7.603) (6.878) (7.650) (5.781) (7.970) (11.647) (9.052) (7.732) 
 
               
Urban Poverty gap 6.814 2.117 8.670 6.448 2.940 7.138 6.306 10.065 8.873 10.624 1.908 5.343 7.761 8.410 4.310 
 (2.512) (1.776) (3.021) (3.285) (1.551) (3.237) (4.273) (3.623) (2.496) (2.752) (1.556) (2.365) (3.835) (3.331) (2.162) 
 
               
Credit to SDP 28.984 10.990 15.934 25.078 18.543 38.069 35.525 19.228 58.493 17.923 25.771 19.315 45.914 17.084 27.575 
 (4.857) (2.003) (4.826) (3.530) (2.865) (8.298) (6.250) (6.179) (20.349) (5.485) (4.405) (5.574) (10.020) (2.712) (2.677) 
 
               
Branches per capita 70.422 49.558 51.310 79.889 79.081 95.866 106.713 61.144 76.792 63.054 111.961 66.249 81.318 58.230 59.914 
 (2.995) (4.508) (4.787) (3.036) (4.183) (3.282) (2.448) (4.080) (2.133) (4.138) (5.121) (5.133) (2.507) (4.639) (3.908) 
                
SDP per capita 8601.0 6270.7 3509.6 11316.9 13096.2 9138.8 9001.5 5963.0 13533.7 5665.4 14968.9 6618.9 9873.4 5333.5 8822.3 
 (6129.6) (3465.5) (1657.3) (7563.5) (8837.2) (6422.1) (6584.5) (3400.0) (8998.7) (3420.8) (9647.2) (4055.4) (7010.7) (2949.1) (6101.7) 
                
Rural population  73.772 88.525 86.911 65.096 74.253 68.308 75.393 76.717 60.626 86.335 69.109 77.303 62.350 80.090 72.514 
 (1.157) (1.013) (0.276) (2.095) (2.581) (1.831) (2.295) (1.536) (2.511) (1.090) (2.429) (0.724) (4.635) (1.000) (0.499) 
                
Government exp. / 
SDP 
18.932 22.026 22.971 17.702 17.584 19.117 21.789 20.097 15.228 22.119 16.442 21.514 19.439 19.357 14.792 
 (1.766) (5.219) (7.269) (2.959) (3.248) (0.940) (2.237) (3.723) (1.433) (3.728) (3.015) (3.003) (1.955) (3.812) (1.444) 
                
Literacy rate 47.389 54.360 40.570 60.749 56.388 56.518 86.246 48.314 65.783 51.401 59.165 43.784 63.561 47.050 58.440 










Table A3- Finance, DRT and Branching Policy: Including rural population share 
This table shows the first stage estimation of the Instrumental variable regressions in Table 5. The regression equation estimated is: Credit to SDP (or Branches per capita)it= 
a0 + β1 DRTit × number of DRT applications per million capita in the first year of establishment + β2 (year-1960) × B60 + β3 (year-1977) × B60 × D77 + β4 (year-1990) × B60 
× D90 + β5 Log (SDP per capita) it+ β6Literacy Rateit + β7Government exp./SDPit + β8Rural populationit + β9 DRTit +si + yt + eit, where DRTit  is time dummy for DRT 
establishment, D77(90) is dummy for post 1977(1990),  B60 is No. bank branches/Mill. capita in 1960, si and yt are state and year dummies. Standard errors clustered at state 
and year level are in parentheses. AP-chi2 is Angrist and Pischke (2009) test of weak instruments. Weak ID test is Stock-Yogo weak identification test with critical values: 
10% maximal LIML size=4.72 15%=3.39 20%=2.99 25%=2.79. *, **, and *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. The definitions and sources of all variables are 
in the Appendix table A1. 
 1982-2004 1964-2004 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
Credit to SDP Branches  per capita Credit to SDP Branches  per capita 
DRT dummy × applications per capita 3.688*** 0.364 3.799*** 0.113 
 (0.475) (0.229) (0.506) (0.278) 
(year-1960) × B60   0.064*** 0.272*** 
   (0.012) (0.064) 
(year-1977) × B60 × D77 -0.019 -0.139*** -0.065*** -0.388*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.061) 
(year-1990) × B60 × D90 0.067* 0.144*** -0.006 0.130*** 
 (0.035) (0.026) (0.031) (0.015) 
Constant 197.897*** 7.154 256.556*** 4.290 
 (26.360) (41.177) (59.312) (65.131) 
Observations 345 345 597 597 
R-squared 0.957 0.992 0.953 0.982 
Control variables YES YES YES YES 
AP-chi2 145.165 45.632 87.534 262.454 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 






Table A4- Finance and Poverty: OLS estimations including rural population share 
The regression equation estimated is: Povertyit = a0 + β1Credit to SDPit + β2Branches per capitait + β6 Log (SDP per capita) it + β7Literacy rateit + β8Government exp./SDPit + 
β9Rural populationit + si + yt + eit where si and yt are state and year dummies. Poverty is one of four measures – Rural Headcount, Urban Headcount, Rural Poverty gap, and 
Urban Poverty gap. All explanatory variables are entered with one year lag. All regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares and with time-variant independent 
variables all lagged by one period. Standard errors clustered at state and year level are in parentheses. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix table 
A1. *, **, and *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 Including rural population 









lag of Credit to SDP -0.082 -0.081*** 0.034 -0.010 
 
(0.051) (0.029) (0.061) (0.025) 
lag of Branches per capita -0.220 -0.070 -0.129 -0.053 
 
(0.182) (0.100) (0.110) (0.042) 
lag of Log(SDP per capita) -0.664 0.082 -7.075 -2.015 
 
(5.395) (3.575) (4.782) (1.489) 
lag of Literacy rate 0.309*** -0.014 0.344 0.061 
 
(0.105) (0.114) (0.244) (0.092) 
lag of Rural population 0.243 -0.080 0.781** 0.222 
 
(0.507) (0.219) (0.370) (0.152) 
lag of Government 
exp./SDP -0.048 -0.007 -0.269** -0.093** 
 
(0.180) (0.075) (0.121) (0.042) 
Constant 33.430 24.142 32.318 11.982 
 
(52.666) (33.875) (48.542) (16.350) 
Observations 345 345 345 345 
R-squared 0.896 0.857 0.894 0.855 






Table A8- Finance and Poverty: Instrumental Variable results including rural population share 
This table presents the second stage of instrumental variable regressions estimated by LIML method. The regression equation estimated is: Povertyit = a0 + β1Instrumented 
value of Credit to SDPit + β2 Instrumented value of Branches per capitait + β3 Log (SDP per capita) it + β4Literacy rateit + β5Government exp./SDPit + β6Rural populationit + si + 
yt + eit where si and yt are state and year dummies. Poverty is one of four measures – Rural headcount, Urban headcount, Rural poverty gap, and Urban poverty gap. The 
instrumented values are obtained from first stage regressions in Table 3. All independent variables are lagged by one period. Standard errors clustered at state and year level 
are in parentheses. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix table A1. The OID test is the Hansen J statistic over-identification test of all instruments. 
*, **, and *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 1983-2005 1965-2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Rural Headcount Rural Poverty gap Urban Headcount Urban Poverty gap Rural Headcount Rural Poverty gap 
lag of Credit to SDP -0.169** -0.092*** -0.074 -0.046 -0.433* -0.178* 
 
(0.082) (0.033) (0.126) (0.045) (0.228) (0.096) 
lag of Branches per capita -0.276 -0.108 -0.041 0.009 -0.302*** -0.118** 
 
(0.197) (0.097) (0.151) (0.090) (0.080) (0.054) 
lag of Log(SDP per capita) -1.524 -0.037 -8.093* -2.348 -5.986 -0.405 
 (4.553) (3.224) (4.506) (1.458) (8.125) (3.823) 
lag of Literacy rate 0.265*** -0.037 0.375 0.089 0.389* 0.127 
 (0.095) (0.101) (0.234) (0.100) (0.227) (0.145) 
lag of Rural population 0.129 -0.076 0.544 0.122 -0.469 -0.139 
 (0.451) (0.182) (0.382) (0.161) (1.093) (0.389) 
lag of Government exp./SDP -0.071 -0.017 -0.260** -0.082** 0.182 0.056 
 (0.160) (0.062) (0.106) (0.035) (0.412) (0.160) 
Observations 345 345 345 345 597 597 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
OID test 0.935 0.260 0.451 0.033 1.195 0.983 







Table A6- Robustness check: first stage. The regressions are estimated similar to Table 3 with additional control variables. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Credit to SDP (%)   
Lag of DRT dummy × applications per capita 3.695*** 3.005*** 3.705*** 3.682***  
(0.486) (0.494) (0.480) (0.509) 
(year-1977) × B60 × D77 -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019  
(0.020) (0.027) (0.021) (0.022) 
(year-1990) × B60 × D90 0.066* 0.072* 0.067* 0.068*  
(0.034) (0.038) (0.034) (0.040) 
development exp. / SDP (%) -0.172 
   
 
(0.346) 
   











   
(0.005) 
 
labor regulation type(flex=+1 neut=0 infl=-1)  
× post 91 trend dummy 
   
-0.009 
    
(0.186) 
Constant 196.843*** 201.945*** 206.178*** 197.322***  
(27.722) (48.279) (26.008) (23.624) 
Observations 345 315 345 345 
R-squared 0.957 0.963 0.958 0.957 
Other Control YES 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Fixed Effects 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
APchi2 108.641 52.742 110.830 131.513 
P_AP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 






Table A7- Robustness test: second stage. The regressions are estimated similar to Table 5 with additional control variables. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Rural Headcount                                       Rural Poverty gap  
Lag of Credit to SDP -0.162** -0.23** -0.176** -0.159** -0.090*** -0.12** -0.1*** -0.09*** 
 
(0.078) (0.110) (0.074) (0.079) (0.032) (0.047) (0.024) (0.033) 
Lag of Branches per capita -0.285 -0.329* -0.351* -0.293 -0.111 -0.157* -0.133 -0.112 
 
(0.212) (0.188) (0.198) (0.212) (0.098) (0.088) (0.106) (0.101) 
lag of development exp. / SDP (%) -0.830*** 
   
-0.241**    
 
(0.246) 
   
(0.108)    








 (0.103)   




  -0.092*  
   
(0.097) 
 
  (0.049)  
lag of unit cost of power supply (Paise/KWH) 
   
-0.016*    -0.004 
    
(0.009)    (0.004) 
Observations 345 315 345 345 345 315 345 345 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Over-identification test 1.066 0.369 1.412 1.152 0.256 0.046 0.819 0.390 






Table A8–Financial deepening and reasons for inter-state migration 
This table presents multinomial logit estimation for households with inter-state migration. The regression equation is Yk,i,t = β1Diff [Credit to SDP)i,t] + β2Diff[Log (SDP per 
capita) it] + β3Diff[Literacy rateit]+ β4Diff[Government exp./SDPit]+ β5Diff[Rural populationit]+ si + yt + eit where si and yt are state and year dummies.  Y is one of eight 
reasons for migration.  The reported coefficients are marginal effects and multiplied by 100 for better illustration. Diff indicates the difference between destination and origin 
(= destination - origin). All explanatory variables are entered with one year lag. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix table A1.  *, **, and *** 
shows significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 search for 
employment 










lag of Difference in Credit to SDP 0.081*** -0.141*** 0.039** 0.009 -0.023 0.054*** -0.012* -0.007 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.015) (0.008) (0.029) (0.010) (0.007) (0.018) 
lag of Difference in SDP per capita 12.648*** 13.404*** -5.071*** -2.134*** -10.358*** -0.319 -1.695*** -6.474*** 
 (0.921) (1.103) (0.665) (0.359) (1.218) (0.466) (0.330) (0.795) 
lag of Difference in Literacy rate -0.130*** 0.018 0.035** -0.007 -0.138*** 0.015 0.014** 0.194*** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.014) (0.007) (0.028) (0.011) (0.007) (0.017) 
lag of Difference in Rural population -0.257*** -0.114* 0.014 -0.041** -0.015 0.030 -0.021 0.404*** 
 (0.050) (0.060) (0.033) (0.017) (0.063) (0.023) (0.016) (0.040) 
lag of Difference in Government expenditures/SDP 0.833*** 0.211** -0.246*** -0.109*** -1.118*** 0.152*** 0.021 0.255*** 
 (0.071) (0.084) (0.050) (0.026) (0.092) (0.036) (0.025) (0.061) 
Monthly per capita expenditure -0.551** 0.516 3.162*** 0.670*** -4.720*** 0.404*** -0.149 0.668*** 
 (0.277) (0.324) (0.131) (0.057) (0.400) (0.125) (0.108) (0.226) 
Household size -2.816*** -2.605*** -0.143** -0.544*** 5.474*** 0.098** 0.081*** 0.455*** 
 (0.101) (0.111) (0.061) (0.049) (0.093) (0.038) (0.024) (0.061) 






Table A9–Financial deepening and reasons for inter-state migration for the sample of migrants from rural to urban tertiary and below 
poverty line 
This table presents multinomial logit estimation for households below poverty line with inter-state migration from rural areas to urban tertiary. The regression equation is 
Yk,i,t = β1Diff [Credit to SDP)i,t] + β2Diff[Log (SDP per capita) it] + β3Diff[Literacy rateit]+ β4Diff[Government exp./SDPit]+ β5Diff[Rural populationit]+ si + yt + eit where si and 
yt are state and year dummies.  Y is one of eight reasons for migration.  The reported coefficients are marginal effects and multiplied by 100 for better illustration. Diff 
indicates the difference between destination and origin (= destination - origin). All explanatory variables are entered with one year lag. The definitions and sources of all 
variables are in the Appendix table A1.  *, **, and *** shows significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 search for 
employment 










lag of Difference in Credit to SDP 0.404*** -0.186* -0.028 -0.014 -0.119** -0.035 -0.036** 0.014 
 (0.096) (0.097) (0.036) (0.022) (0.055) (0.039) (0.017) (0.036) 
lag of Difference in SDP per capita 0.095** 0.115*** -0.037*** 0.003 -0.109*** -0.017 -0.037*** -0.012 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.014) (0.008) (0.022) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015) 
lag of Difference in Literacy rate -0.002* 0.001 0.000 -0.000** 0.001* 0.000 0.000* -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lag of Difference in Rural population -0.009 0.114 -0.067 0.015 0.038 -0.112 -0.126*** 0.148** 
 (0.208) (0.209) (0.069) (0.042) (0.106) (0.077) (0.042) (0.072) 
lag of Difference in Government expenditures/SDP 1.180*** -0.511* 0.131 -0.012 -0.734*** 0.133 -0.085 -0.101 
 (0.301) (0.301) (0.111) (0.068) (0.166) (0.110) (0.060) (0.113) 
Monthly per capita expenditure 0.021 -0.033** 0.015*** 0.004* 0.001 -0.006 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Household size -0.022*** -0.005 0.003*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.003** 0.001* 0.003** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 






Table A10- Sector-wise financial development 
The regression equation estimated is: Primary/Secondary/Tertiary Credit to SDPit = a0 + β1 DRTit × number of DRT applications per million capita in the first year of 
establishment + β2 (year-1960) × B60 + β3 (year-1977) × B60 × D77 + β4 (year-1990) × B60 × D90 + β5 Log (SDP per capita) it+ β6Literacy Rateit + β7Government exp./SDPit 
+ β8Rural populationit + β9 DRTit +si + yt + eit, where DRTit  is time dummy for DRT establishment, D77(90) is dummy for post 1977(1990),  B60 is No. bank branches/Mill. 
capita in 1960, si and yt are state and year dummies. All regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares. Standard errors clustered at state and year level are in 
parentheses. AP-chi2 is Angrist and Pischke (2009) test of weak instruments. Weak ID test is Stock-Yogo weak identification test with critical values: 10% maximal LIML 
size=4.72 15%=3.39 20%=2.99 25%=2.79. *, **, and *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the Appendix table 
A1. 
 
(1) (2) (3)  
Credit/SDP -Primary sector Credit/SDP -Secondary sector Credit/SDP -Tertiary sector 
Lag of DRT dummy × applications per capita 0.208 -1.120 6.359*** 
 (0.298) (1.045) (1.261) 
(year-1977) × B60 × D77 -0.075** 0.004 -0.008  
(0.033) (0.069) (0.052) 
(year-1990) × B60 × D90 0.143*** 0.021 0.066  
(0.046) (0.103) (0.063) 
Constant 110.002** 241.772* 197.938**  
(42.697) (123.091) (79.956) 
Observations 270 270 270 
R-squared 0.839 0.698 0.888 
Control variables YES YES YES 
APchi2 5.611 43.709 91.438 
P-value 0.373 0.001 0.000 









Web Appendix B: Construction of poverty and migration variables  
Poverty and migration measures are calculated using socioeconomic surveys of India. 
The National Sample Survey Office or NSSO is the largest organization in India conducting 
regular socio-economic surveys. The schedule 1.0 of each round is a survey of household 
consumer expenditures which has been carried out in India since 1950s. However, prior to 
1990s, they were not evenly spaced and sampled. The “thick” (large-sample) rounds are 
conducted about every five years and some “thin” rounds are in between. Datt et al. (1996) 
provides the time series of state-wise headcount and poverty gap measures from 1951-1992. 
Since 1986, NSSO has started to conduct and make available “thin” surveys on an annual basis 
and thick surveys every five years. We obtain the data of 20 rounds (38, 43, and 45 to 62) and 
among them; the thick surveys are 38th, 43th, 50th, 55th, and 61th rounds. For the missing years, 
we make use of Datt et al. (1996) data41.  
Round Time span Round Time span Round Time span Round Time span 
38 1983 48 Jan-Dec1992 53 Jan-Dec1997 58 July-Dec2002 
43 July87-June88 49 Jan-June1993 54 Jan-June1998 59 Jan-Dec2003 
45 July89-June90 50 July93-June94 55 July99-June2000 60 Jan-June2004 
46 July90-June91 51 July94-June95 56 july2000-june01 61 July04-June05 
47 July-Dec1991 52 July95-June96 57 July2001-June02 62 July05-June06 
The NSSO’s household expenditure survey has a variety of data at household level. It 
provides information on expenditure patterns, employment (self-employed, labor, etc.), 
education, occupation, and some other characteristics of households and individuals which 
enable us to compute a variety of within group measures. It covers all Indian states and follows 
the Indian Census definition of urban and rural areas. To be classified urban, an area needs to 
meet several criteria regarding size and density of the population, and the share of male working 
population engaged in non-agricultural pursuits. However, the surveys are not quite the same and 
 
41 The data is available at: http://go.worldbank.org/YMRH2NT5V0. We use their data for 1960-82 and 1984-87. 
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to make comparable indices over time, we make two adjustments: one for a methodology change 
and the other for seasonal effects.  
There was a change in recall period of surveys in 51th to 54th rounds. Until the round 50 
and after the round 55 food, tobacco and intoxicant items were asked and reported by a 30-day 
recall period, but in the rounds 51 to 54 two sub-samples are defined: one with 30-day and the 
other with 7-day recall period for those items42. Deaton (2003) and Tarozzi (2007) show that 
there is an upward bias in total expenditures when the recall period is shorter. To achieve 
comparability, he suggests using the goods with unchanging recall period to find the true 
distribution of total expenditures. With plausible assumptions, Tarozzi (2007) shows that if τ 
represents survey type, and v is the bundle of goods that have the same recall period, the 
distributions of income y in the two sub-samples have the following relation  
!(#|% = 1) = !(#|% = 0) × + ,-(%	 = 	1	|	/)-(%	 = 	0)-(%	 = 	0	|	/)-(%	 = 	1) 0#, % = 02 
Where -(%	|	/) is estimated by a logit regression. Using this approach, we impute the correct 
poverty measures of the rounds 51 to 54. 
The second adjustment is done for removing seasonal bias. Table 1 shows that the 
surveys are not distributed evenly across time. Moreover, most rounds are conducted in two 
adjacent years. Therefore, estimating each survey separately poses two problems: First, it is not 
for one exact year, but the rest of variables in the paper are year-specific. Second, some surveys 
do not cover four seasons (like rounds 47), so the expenditures have a seasonal bias in them. To 
control for these problems, we estimate the indices for each season (sub-round) and then average 
them over each specific year. Before 1987, we just have data of 1983, but after 1987 the missing 
points are fewer (14 of 78), so we interpolate seasonal data after 1987 using Cubic Spline 
 
42 In the round 55 these items were asked with both of the recall periods independently and we used the 30-day data. 
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method. This method is a common way to impute high-frequency data from low-frequency (like 
seasonal from annual). If we have n point and n-1 space in between, this method assigns a cubic 
polynomial for each space to connect the two points and forces all first and second derivatives to 
be continuous at margins.   
In order to estimate state-level headcount and poverty gap, we utilize the same poverty 
line as Datt et al. (1996) because our measures are updated for 1960-82 and 1984-87 using their 
data. The poverty line is recommended by the Planning Commission in 1993 based on calorie 
intake and adjusted for other years using price indices (for details, see notes of Datt et al, 1996). 
The Planning commission also has separate estimates of poverty line based on calorie intake in 
1983, 1987, 1999, and 2004. As an alternative, we take these measures and interpolate the line 
using price indices for the years in between and re-estimate headcount and poverty gap. Our 
results are robust to this adjustment with a slight change in the level (not significance) of the 
coefficients. More recent poverty lines for 1993-04 and 2004-05 are presented in Radhakrishna 
et al. (2009). Compared to the older lines their estimates are based on normative expenditure on 
food, education, and health and are higher than calorie intake lines. Nevertheless, applying these 
lines (price adjusted for the other years) results in a parallel increase in the poverty measure 
across states with no change in the qualitative results of our regressions. Table B.1 shows the 
state-level headcount measures in 2004 using the two new poverty lines and compares it with 
official estimates. The small difference between the two groups is mainly due to seasonal 
adjustment because our estimates for 2004 includes the first half of 2004-05 and the second half 
of 2003-04 surveys. Table B.2 presents our main IV regressions with the poverty estimates by 




Table B.1- Headcount ratio using different poverty lines. 
Headcount ratio our estimations (2004) official estimations (2004-05) 









Andhra Pradesh 9.51 8.20 32.08 7.5 32.3 
Assam 14.21 14.72 34.21 17 36.4 
Bihar 29.94 31.34 50.30 32.9 55.7 
Gujarat 14.87 12.54 37.70 13.9 39.1 
Haryana 7.20 6.63 20.91 9.2 24.8 
Karnataka 13.92 11.22 31.68 12 37.5 
Kerala 8.16 8.40 16.48 9.6 20.2 
Madhya Pradesh 23.17 25.64 46.93 29.8 53.6 
Maharashtra 19.16 16.36 40.08 22.2 47.9 
Orissa 28.28 35.24 56.29 39.8 60.8 
Punjab 4.60 4.60 18.70 5.9 22.1 
Rajasthan 18.12 11.73 33.20 14.3 35.9 
Tamil Nadu 14.19 14.33 33.47 16.9 37.5 
Uttar Pradesh 18.90 21.88 35.83 25.3 42.7 
West Bengal 12.97 18.42 30.82 24.2 38.2 
 
Table B.2- IV results of Table 5 using different poverty lines. 
Poverty line Planning commission Radhakrishna et al. 
 Rural poverty Rural poverty gap Rural poverty Rural poverty gap 
Lag of Credit to SDP -0.188** -0.082** -0.614** -0.295** 
 (0.083) (0.036) (0.270) (0.137) 
Lag of Branches per capita -0.050 -0.094 0.412 0.200 
 (0.246) (0.107) (0.711) (0.293) 
Observations 345 345 345 345 
R-squared -0.004 0.009 0.220 0.172 
Over ID P-value 0.332 0.427 0.509 0.416 
 
The migration surveys has been conducted in 5 rounds by NSSO since 1980 including 
1983 (round 38, schedule 10), 1987-88 (round 43, schedule 10), 1993 (round 49, schedule 1.2), 
1999-2000 (round 55, schedule 10), 2007-08 (round 64, schedule 10.2).  Using these surveys the 
migration measures are estimated.   
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